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 i 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to examine whether there is a better way in which 
higher education institutions might approach financial management, including 
the way in which they choose to allocate resources within their institutions.  Why 
do I ask this?  On the basis that higher education institutions exist not only to 
educate students, but also to contribute to the development and furtherance of 
knowledge, as well as making a contribution to the national economy in terms of 
expertise and commercialisation of intellectual property, I considered the way in 
which my own institution addressed these issues from the perspective of 
seeking to ensure that the resources available to it were allocated in a manner 
that may best facilitate the achievement of these objectives. 
 
I was not convinced that my own institution’s relatively ‘simple’ model of 
allocating resources in relation to student numbers, based on the model used 
by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), was the best 
way of achieving the objectives set out in the preceding paragraph.  A number 
of questions sprang immediately to mind.  How does the model address the 
issue of quality?  How does the model address the achievement of the 
institution’s strategic objectives?  How does the model address the issue of 
directing resources to areas identified as key to the institution’s academic 
offering?  The list was endless. 
 
The dissertation draws on my own experience across a range of sectors, and I 
chose the National Health Service as a comparator group that exhibits many of 
the characteristics of higher education institutions.  It is a large consumer of 
public resources, is labour intensive, and needs to prioritise the allocation of 
resources to deliver strategic and national objectives.  In light of this, I believe 
that it is legitimate to draw on the experience of the review of the National 
Health Service from 1974, particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s, that review 
being based on the applicability of two financial management techniques, 
Rationalism and Incrementalism. 
 ii 
Preface
 
 
Before embarking on my PhD I reviewed a considerable number of PhD 
dissertations to get a feel for what was required.  I have to say that I was 
daunted by the length of a lot of them, and wondered whether I would ever have 
time to produce a similar document. 
 
I have always believed that something said in simple language is likely to be 
understood, whereas something that is not said simply is liable to lead to 
confusion.  My dissertation is intended, therefore, to be expressed in a simple 
and straightforward format.  I hope the reader will not be minded to conclude 
that because it is not a hugely lengthy document, it cannot be considered 
worthy of a PhD. 
 
In support of this approach, I shall quote the words of an academic colleague 
friend, Professor Ray Paul.  Professor Paul produced what he termed his Law 
of Knowledge.  This states ‘Something is understood if it can be expressed 
simply, and if it cannot be expressed simply, it is not understood’. 
 
My research studies and dissertation have used this as a guiding principle, and 
I hope I have achieved my aim of producing a dissertation that is expressed in 
simple language, and that demonstrates an understanding of my chosen topic. 
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Dissemination
 
 
As a consequence of the consideration of the applicability of this research to 
higher education institutions, my own university has decided to adopt the 
incrementalist approach to the allocation of resources.  It has also decided to 
move away from the mechanistic model of resource allocation, and it has 
implemented an expenditure-based budget allocation model for the allocation 
round 2005/06 rather than continue to follow the HEFCE national formula.  I 
believe my institution has taken a very positive step in the right direction, and 
will be able to ensure that its resource allocation process can indeed be aligned 
with the delivery of its strategic objectives.  Its adoption across the institution 
has not been without a degree of pain, since the academic community, whilst 
quick to criticise the existing, is not too keen to move into the unknown.  The 
process took over two years to implement, but the hard work has now been 
done. 
 
Whether the wider academic world would be prepared to adopt this approach is 
an unknown, but I hope that this dissertation will encourage others to tread what 
is seen by many in the academic community as a dangerous path. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
OBJECTIVES AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Objectives 
 
I joined the higher education world in April 2001 as the Finance Director of Brunel 
University, a pre-1992 university, having previously held senior finance positions in 
further education, social housing, the National Health Service and the private 
sector.  I soon became intellectually challenged by the way in which my own 
University, and other higher education institutions that I visited, approached 
financial management.  The result was that I undertook this research with the 
objective of examining whether there is a way in which higher education 
institutions might better approach financial management. 
 
The dissertation first reviews the way in which the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE) allocates to higher education institutions the 
resources made available to it by the Government, this being the basis of the 
model used by many higher education institutions to allocate those resources 
within their own institutions. 
 
The dissertation then reviews the way in which my own University allocated 
resources, using the HEFCE model as a basis, across the various academic, 
academic support and administrative departments, and considers the effect of 
applying such an approach. 
 
During my career, I have experienced a number of different financial management 
techniques.  This dissertation will review the two that have been chosen, that is, 
Rationalism and Incrementalism, to gain an understanding of their principles as 
financial management techniques.  I chose these two techniques as I have 
experience of them from previous working environments, I can see the potential 
for their application in the world of higher education, and I believe they are worthy 
of investigation in the context of this dissertation. 
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It will then examine the way in which the National Health Service approached 
financial management from 1974, particularly in the mid 1970s and 1980s, 
outlining the problems involved with the attempt to introduce a Rationalism 
approach.  The National Health Service was chosen as it exhibits many of the 
characteristics of higher education institutions, comprising of a similar mix of 
‘academics’ and administrators, having areas of activity that compete for 
resources, and also being required to respond to, and deliver, a number of 
Government objectives.  It provides a good comparator in terms of the potential 
application in higher education institutions of the theories examined in the earlier 
part of the dissertation, drawing on the experience of the National Health Service. 
 
1.2 Background 
 
The higher education world consists of a diverse range of organisations 
(Ramsden, 2001) sharing the basic aim of providing higher-level teaching and 
research to students from a range of backgrounds, academic achievement levels 
and cultures.  At the present time, there are 129 higher education institutions and 
147 further education colleges in England in receipt of HEFCE funding (HEFCE, 
2005a).  They are diverse, ranging in size, history, subject mix and mission.  This 
very diversity amongst higher education institutions may pose a significant 
challenge to some of them in the context of the resources that can be devoted to 
the areas of activity that produce effective financial management. 
 
Higher education institutions are consumers of significant public sector resources; 
some £6.3 billion of public funding is being provided in 2005/06 by HEFCE 
(HEFCE, 2005b), and total revenue for higher education institutions for 2004/05 
was around £18 billion (HESA, 2006).  If higher education institutions are to 
maximise the contribution they make to the advancement of knowledge, and thus 
to the United Kingdom economy, it is essential that the resources available to 
them are allocated in a strategic manner, consistent with the delivery of 
institutional objectives. 
 
When I took up my post as Finance Director of Brunel University, I was surprised 
to find that the resource allocation method used appeared to take no account of 
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the University’s strategic objectives, but was a purely mechanistic model based on 
student numbers.  My surprise was based on the fact that, when I was the Finance 
Director of the Further Education Funding Council for England (FEFC), I stressed 
the need for further education colleges to ensure that the resources made 
available to them were used to deliver their strategic objectives.  I did not believe 
that the FEFC model for calculating grant allocations to further education colleges 
was appropriate for use as an internal allocation model, since it was based 
necessarily on very high-level criteria that could be used as the basis for a national 
formula. 
 
I was interested to know how many other higher education institutions adopted a 
resource allocation method similar to that used by my own University.  I visited, 
during 2001, six universities that featured in the upper quartile in The Times 
league tables.  I found that, they too, used the same mechanistic model.  I raised 
my concerns about the use of such a mechanistic model with a number of my 
fellow finance directors at meetings of the British Universities’ Finance Directors’ 
Group (BUFDG) and, as part of my research, I circulated a questionnaire to all 
higher education institutions to ascertain what resource allocation model was 
used, and also to find out whether, if they used a similar model, they thought it 
facilitated the delivery of their institution’s strategic objectives.  The results are set 
out in annex A. 
 
In terms of selecting the most appropriate form of survey, I was mindful of the fact 
that the topic for my dissertation could be relevant to a significant proportion of 
higher education institutions, as well as having potential advantages in terms of a 
more inclusive approach to the allocation of resources and a more effective use of 
them.  I decided, therefore, to survey all higher education institutions in receipt of 
HEFCE funding.  Such an approach offered the opportunity to ensure that the 
results would be based on a sufficiently large and representative return from the 
target institutions, thereby avoiding the risk of a biased result.  There are a number 
of survey techniques that may be used, including personal interviews, telephone 
surveys, mail surveys, each having its own advantages and disadvantages.  I 
chose an e:mail survey not only because of the advantage of speed and low cost, 
but also because the two questions that I wanted answering were very 
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straightforward, and could be answered with a simple Yes or No.  The choice of 
this type of question enabled the data to be converted into binary notation, thus 
facilitating the analysis of the information provided in the responses. 
 
The response rate of 62% was good, particularly as it included the majority of the 
larger higher education institutions.  On the basis of the returns, 73% of the 
respondents use a resource allocation model similar to that used by my own 
University, and 71% of those that use such a model believe that it facilitates the 
delivery of their institution’s strategic objectives.  The issue that I am researching 
is relevant, therefore, to a significant proportion of higher education institutions.  If 
there is a better way of allocating resources to maximise strategic objectives, there 
is a considerable prize to be won in terms of increasing the effectiveness of the 
use of resources consumed by higher education institutions. 
 
Over the past years, higher education institutions have operated with the aim of 
providing higher education more cost effectively within a climate of a reduction of 
resources in real terms (Universities UK, 2004).  It is widely accepted that size 
offers significant opportunities for increased efficiency, particularly in terms of 
administrative support structures.  Those higher education institutions that are too 
small to take advantage of such efficiencies of operation face a significant 
challenge in terms of effective financial management.  Despite this, they are still 
expected to cope with changes in Government and/or HEFCE policy, and also with 
the increasing number of specifically targeted funding initiatives.  The use of such 
initiatives runs the risk of reducing the ability of higher education institutions to 
respond to their own particular circumstances, as it forces them to use resources 
for specific purposes rather than for purposes that they consider to have a higher 
priority. 
 
Higher education institutions have also had to operate during this period under a 
climate of increasing student expectations, particularly since the introduction of 
student tuition fees in 1998.  These expectations are likely to increase with the 
introduction of higher fees in September 2006 (Higher Education Act 2004, 2004).  
Whilst some may argue that differential fees could lead to a range of expectations, 
it is probably the case that all students will have higher expectations than at 
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present, but those paying higher fees are likely to have higher expectations than 
those paying lower fees. 
 
Higher education institutions have responded to these challenges primarily by 
introducing organisational change.  As the government does not enjoy a direct 
relationship with higher education institutions, it has sought to influence the 
planning and budgeting processes by introducing targeted funding, this being one 
of the only ways available to it to seek to ensure that its manifesto promises are 
met.  Such an approach could be seen as confusing the terms 'priorities' and 
'planning', priorities being the concern of government and planning the concern of 
higher education institutions.  The two terms are not synonymous and the methods 
of producing 'priorities' and 'plans' are normally quite distinct. 
 
This could lead to confusion within higher education institutions if they choose to 
adopt the same process for the internal allocation of resources as HEFCE uses to 
allocate resources to the higher education institutions to which it provides funding.  
This will be explored as part of this dissertation. 
 
The process of organisational change requires higher education institutions to 
review their curriculum offer and, for research-intensive institutions, also to review 
those areas that are regarded, or could become regarded, as world-class fields of 
excellence.  This is extremely important in light of HEFCE’s future more selective 
approach to the funding of research activity (HEFCE, 2003).  The success of this 
process relies, to a significant extent, on the existence of a robust process by 
which higher education institutions can direct resources to areas identified as key 
to the future success of the higher education institution.  An effective financial 
management and decision making system should be capable of supporting this 
process, thereby enabling the achievement of the objective.  The challenge for 
higher education institutions is to deliver their strategic objectives by identifying 
courses of action that are supported by relevant and pro-active resource allocation 
models. 
 
Financial management, in terms of planning and budgeting, involves choice, and 
this dissertation seeks to examine two of the ways by which choices can be made, 
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as well as the ways in which they are subsequently implemented via the financial 
management process.  The dissertation also seeks to examine the assertion that it 
is important for any financial management system to ensure that it does not 
introduce significant disillusionment amongst the higher education institution 
community, an aspect to which much attention should be paid, since it is the 
academic community that will ultimately have a significant bearing on the success 
of a higher education institution. 
 
In this context, the dissertation examines the way in which higher education 
institutions might approach the allocation of resources.  The dissertation first 
considers the theory of rationalism in decision making and looks at the methods 
adopted, primarily originating in the United States, and their relative success and 
failure. 
 
The dissertation also considers the theory of incrementalism, outlining the 
problems of rationalism and seeking to identify how incrementalism can help. 
 
The dissertation looks at the way in which financial management has been 
undertaken in the National Health Service, and outlines the problems involved and 
possible solutions.  The dissertation also looks at the applicability of those 
solutions to the problems faced by higher education institutions. 
 
The dissertation explores what type of decision making may be more suited to 
higher education institutions under existing conditions, and whether the adoption 
of such a decision making process is likely to have a positive impact on the 
improvement of financial management in higher education institutions. 
 
1.3 Problems 
 
Higher education institutions range in size and complexity, and adopt different 
academic and management structures to enable them to deliver their stated 
objectives and mission, but they all share the common aim of providing a learning 
experience.  They operate in an increasingly competitive environment, and are 
constantly facing fresh challenges outside of the basic challenge of maintaining 
 7 
 
academic excellence.  One of the most difficult challenges for senior management 
is how to manage an organisation that consists of a collection of academics, 
working in a number of departments, many of whom may be pursuing their own 
set of objectives and goals, which may or may not be consistent with those of the 
institution.  Not only could this introduce tension between departments, but also 
between individual academics.  Such tensions could result in polarisation within 
the academic community, making it difficult for the institution to operate as a 
coherent organisation.  This could lead to a breakdown in management resulting, 
in the extreme, in the demise of the higher education institution. 
 
There is not only competition between academic departments, but also between 
academics within departments who may feel that their particular area of expertise 
is of prime importance and should be supported in preference to another area.  
Add to this the additional need to provide funds to support the non-academic areas 
of activity within higher education institutions, and it can be seen that there is 
significant potential for things to go wrong. 
 
The challenge facing higher education institutions is one of balancing a set of 
competing objectives to secure the future existence of the higher education 
institution and the retention of key academics.  This is very much the case in the 
context of the financial management of higher education institutions, particularly in 
the current climate of scarce resources and increasing competition.  The solution 
advocated by some is to introduce more private sector practices into higher 
education institutions. 
 
Whether this really is a solution is debatable, since the majority of private sector 
organisations operate in a completely different environment where process is the 
order of the day, and employees are driven by very tangible benefits or outcomes. 
 
That is not to say that higher education institutions should not operate in a 
‘business-like manner’, but it must be remembered that, in general, they are not 
driven by the same ‘profit’ motive as the private sector.  Can higher education 
institutions, by their very nature of being a collection of academics pursuing 
excellence, particularly in the field of research, be managed in the same way?  A 
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tremendous culture shift would be required, and it is important for this to be 
recognised in any system of financial management.  In this context, the recognition 
of the human behavioural aspects within an academic community is likely to be as 
important as the application of financial management techniques.  My review of 
the National Health Service will explore this concept. 
 
Competing time pressures are becoming a significant problem in the context of 
management in general, and there is increasingly less time to stand back, think, 
review and formulate ideas and policy.  This pressure makes it all the more 
important for any effective system of financial management to recognise the need 
for early dialogue, and to adopt relatively simple and uncomplicated methods for 
achieving acceptable financial outcomes. 
 
1.4 Approaches to the problems 
 
In examining the problems facing financial management in higher education 
institutions, this dissertation will examine the theory that successful financial 
management in higher education institutions is unlikely to be achieved by the rigid 
adherence to traditional financial procedures and processes, but is more likely to 
be successful if particular attention is devoted to the human behavioural aspects.  
In examining this theory, the dissertation will consider and compare the two 
theories of Rationalism and Incrementalism, drawing conclusions about their 
applicability to the higher education world, and also their potential for success. 
 
The dissertation will also review the experience of the National Health Service 
following the 1974 reorganisation, particularly the attempt to introduce a National 
Health Service Planning System in the 1970s and 1980s.  Whilst this is some 20 
years old, there has been very little real change in theory and practice since that 
time; rather, all that has happened is that the Government has attempted to 
introduce the same principles using different words and phrases.  It is well worth 
exploring a ‘real-life’ scenario in this dissertation.  The National Health Service 
provides a relevant example, as it not only contains the same element of drive for 
academic excellence, in terms of the aspirations of the diverse range of 
consultants working in very highly specialised fields of medicine, but it also has a 
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number of output measures that successive governments have sought to influence 
through the attempted introduction of traditional financial management practices.  
Whilst this adds an additional dimension to the problem faced by higher education 
institutions, the basic issues faced by both are very similar. 
 
The dissertation will look at the way in which the human behavioural aspects can 
exert influence over the success or otherwise of financial management, and also 
the extent to which private sector practices may work in environments like higher 
education institutions. 
 
The dissertation will also consider the extent to which, because those employed in 
organisations such as higher education institutions are likely to be working in that 
environment for reasons other than financial, there is a need for successful 
financial management to recognise that, in adopting a ‘business-like’ approach, 
one also adopts an approach that may be described as ‘operating with a social 
conscience’.  In other words, is there a need for any system of financial 
management in the world of higher education to recognise that decisions cannot 
always be taken on the basis of pure financial outcomes, important as they may 
be, but rather they should be taken within the context of the wider social 
implications?  This is very different to the world of the private sector that, in the 
main, is process driven, and operates within a very strict financial discipline geared 
towards the achievement of profit rather than social outcomes. 
 
1.5 Research objectives 
 
The objective of this research is very simple.  It reviews HEFCE’s funding model, 
reviews my own University’s resource allocation method, reviews two methods of 
decision making, considers their effect in relation to the National Health Service, 
and attempts to determine whether either of these approaches, considered 
together with the experience of the National Health Service, might contribute to 
more effective financial management in higher education institutions.  If there is 
anything to be found, the dissertation will attempt to identify it.  It will explore the 
suggestion that far more attention needs to be devoted to the integration of human 
behavioural aspects into the financial management process if higher education 
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institutions are to make significant strides in delivering more effective financial 
management. 
 
There are a multitude of aspects contributing to the term financial management, 
and it will not be possible in this dissertation to deal with them all.  That is why I 
shall concentrate on what may be considered to be one of the most important 
aspects over which individual higher education institutions have control, that is, the 
interaction of human behaviour with the financial management process. 
 
This dissertation may be likened to a series of Christmas boxes.  Only when all the 
boxes have been unwrapped or read will you find that they fit together like a 
Petrushka doll. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the system used by the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (HEFCE) for allocating resources to the higher education institutions to 
which it provides funds.  This sets a background for Chapter 3, since it is 
necessary to understand the basis used by HEFCE to allocate funds on a national 
basis, thereby enabling some form of conclusion to be reached as to its 
applicability for use as an institutional allocation mechanism. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the way in which my own University allocated the funds 
available to it, and seeks to identify some of the problems caused by following, at 
an institutional level, the HEFCE national model.  My University’s resource 
allocation model was changed for the 2005/06 allocation round, and the new 
method is explained in Chapter 8. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the theory of rationalism, one of the two theories that are 
reviewed in this dissertation.  This dissertation identifies the key principles of this 
approach, particularly in terms of the way in which the human relations school 
focuses on the rational nature of human behaviour informed by data evaluation, 
leading to the notion that rational or reasoned models can be adopted, therefore, 
when considering financial management systems. 
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Chapter 5 then examines the theory of incrementalism, the second of the two 
theories reviewed in this dissertation.  This dissertation reviews the concept, 
inherent in terms of an incrementalist approach, that history offers the best guide 
to predicting the future and, therefore, is of greater use when considering financial 
management systems. 
 
Chapter 6 reviews the way in which the National Health Service has approached 
financial management since 1974, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, in terms of 
a consideration of the two approaches reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5, and the 
reasons behind the decision to continue with an incrementalist approach to 
financial management. 
 
Chapter 7 draws together the previous chapters by comparing the experience of 
the National Health Service to that of higher education institutions, the two sectors 
sharing a significant number of similarities.  A comparison of the two approaches 
enables the dissertation to consider their applicability to the way in which higher 
education institutions might best approach financial management in terms of the 
way in which they are structured and managed.  The consideration of the funding 
approach adopted by HEFCE also enables the dissertation to consider, in 
conjunction with the two theories discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the experience of 
what happened in the National Health Service, it being equally relevant to the 
higher education sector.  The intention of this dissertation is to help inform the 
consideration of the approach to financial management by higher education 
institutions that may be of most benefit. 
 
Chapter 8 sets out the basis on which I recommended that my own University 
should move away from a mechanistic resource allocation model to one based on 
the principles of incrementalism, and also the actual method adopted for the new 
model.  It also suggests the further research that I believe should be undertaken to 
assess the validity of the proposed approach, and to enable a legitimate 
comparison of the former and new models to be made. 
 
Chapter 9 is a personal reflection following the completion of the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
HIGHER EDUCATION FUNDING COUNCIL for ENGLAND’s RESOURCE 
ALLOCATON SYSTEM 
 
2.1 Background 
 
This chapter examines the system used by the Higher Education Funding Council 
for England (HEFCE) for allocating resources to the higher education institutions 
to which it provides funds.  This sets a background for Chapter 3, since it is 
necessary to understand the basis used by HEFCE to allocate funds on a national 
basis, thereby enabling some form of conclusion to be reached as to its 
applicability for use as an institutional allocation mechanism. 
 
The system used by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) 
to allocate grants to the higher education institutions that it supports is based on a 
number of criteria that can be applied on a national basis.  Whilst HEFCE’s 
formula calculates the grant of every higher education institution in some detail, 
HEFCE actually gives each higher education institution a single allocation of funds 
to be spent at the higher education institution’s discretion.  HEFCE’s block grant 
funding system is based, therefore, on outputs and outcomes.  This is in marked 
contrast with the system used by the former University Grants Committee which 
allocated grant funding on inputs. 
 
Such a block grant system is inevitable, since it would be impractical for a national 
funding body to attempt to adopt individual institutional or regional criteria other 
than on a very selective basis.  The most obvious example of such a criterion is 
the use of London Weighting factors to reflect the higher costs associated with 
operating in London.  The system used by HEFCE is intended to operate, 
therefore, in broad terms, and to be as efficient as possible in distributing funds 
between higher education institutions; it is not designed as a mechanism for 
distributing funds within a higher education institution. 
 
Other than funds that are provided for very specific activities, the funds made 
available to higher education institutions are conditional only on the funds being 
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used for eligible activities as set out in section 65(2) of the Further and Higher 
Education Act 1992.  The system is described in the following paragraphs. 
 
2.2 The funding method for teaching 
 
The funding method for teaching was introduced by HEFCE for the allocation 
round 1998-99, and is based on the broad principle that similar activities should be 
funded at similar rates, with variations from these rates based on previously 
determined factors. 
 
Under the method, HEFCE calculates a standard level of teaching resource for 
each institution.  This is a notional resource level, based on the higher education 
institution’s student profile and institutional characteristics, and covers both 
HEFCE grant and tuition fees.  HEFCE compares this standard resource with what 
the institution actually receives in HEFCE grant plus HEFCE’s assumptions of 
income from tuition fees, which together are referred to as assumed resource. 
 
The principle of the funding method is that similar activities should be funded at 
similar rates, so HEFCE wants the assumed resource to come within an 
acceptable margin of standard resource for the higher education institution as a 
whole.  This margin of 5% above and below standard resource is called the 
tolerance band.  If the difference between the assumed resource and the standard 
resource is more than 5%, HEFCE will take action to ensure that the higher 
education institution comes within the ±5% tolerance band over an agreed period 
of time.  This may be by changing HEFCE’s grant funding level, or by requiring 
changes in the higher education institution’s student numbers. 
 
2.3 Standard resource 
 
HEFCE calculates the standard resource by weighting students, expressed in full-
time equivalents (FTEs), according to one of only four price groups, which are 
intended to reflect the relative costs of provision in different subjects.  Since higher 
education institutions offer many hundreds of courses across a very wide range of 
subject areas, these price groups can reflect costs only on a broad national basis, 
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since it is likely that different higher education institutions will devote a different 
level of actual resource to the delivery of these subjects.  Further weights are 
applied for part-time students, students on long courses and those on foundation 
degrees.  Higher educational institutional factors are also reflected through 
weights applied to student numbers.  These are for the additional costs of 
provision in London, and the extra costs of some specialist institutions, small 
institutions, and those with old and historic buildings.  The standard resource is 
calculated for each higher education institution by multiplying its total weighted 
FTEs by a base price determined by HEFCE. 
 
2.4 Assumed resource 
 
Assumed resource comprises HEFCE grant plus HEFCE’s assumptions of income 
from tuition fees.  The starting point for calculating HEFCE’s grant is the funding 
allocated the previous year.  HEFCE then makes adjustments where appropriate 
for any holdback of grant (if the higher education institution has not met the terms 
of HEFCE’s funding agreement), inflation, funding for additional student places, 
and other miscellaneous adjustments and transfers.  HEFCE calculates assumed 
fee income by applying specified fee rates to the same student FTEs used in 
calculating the standard resource.  The fee rates commonly reflect those specified 
by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES). 
 
2.5 Migration 
 
For some higher education institutions, the assumed resource differs from the 
standard resource by more than 5%.  If this is as a result of the changes to the 
teaching funding method, then HEFCE will work with the higher education 
institution to help it come within the ±5% tolerance band over an agreed period by 
adjusting funding or student numbers.  This process is called migration.  If higher 
education institutions move further away from the tolerance band because of their 
own recruitment behaviour, HEFCE expects them to manage any process for 
recovering their position.  In particular, if they move above it (become ‘over-
resourced’), they may be liable to an immediate reduction in grant.  If they move 
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below it (become ‘under-resourced’), they may need to reduce student numbers 
the following year. 
 
2.6 The funding agreement 
 
HEFCE has a funding agreement with each higher education institution.  This 
specifies what HEFCE expects the institution to deliver in return for the funding 
provided. 
 
If higher education institutions do not comply with the terms of their funding 
agreement, HEFCE may withdraw some of their funding for teaching.  This is 
known as ‘holdback’. 
 
2.7 The funding method for research 
 
The current funding method was first applied for 1997-98, and is described in 
HEFCE 4/97 Funding method for research from 1997-98, and in HEFCE 2003/29 
Funding Higher Education in England. 
 
There are six elements that make up HEFCE’s research funding for 2006-07: 
 
• mainstream quality-related research (QR) funding.  HEFCE distributes this 
between the units of assessment (UoAs) used in the most recent Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE), according to their volume of research 
weighted by the relative cost of research in different subjects.  HEFCE 
distributes the total for each UoA between higher education institutions 
according to their volume of research weighted by their quality rating.  The 
main volume measure for research is the number of research active staff 
submitted in the 2001 RAE.  There are also minor volume measures 
(numbers of research assistants and fellows) that are updated annually; 
 
• funds for the supervision of research students on Research Degree 
Programmes (RDP’s).  HEFCE distributes these according to the number of 
research students in departments rated 4 or above, weighted by the relative 
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cost of research in their UoA and London Weighting.  There is also 
transitional RDP supervision funding for students in departments rated 3a in 
those UoAs that do not receive research capability funding, although this is 
being phased out, and will be zero in the year 2008-09; 
 
• London Weighting premium.  For higher education institutions in London, 
this is calculated as a proportion of the above two allocations; 
 
• funding for the ‘best 5-star’ departments.  These are the departments that 
either achieved a rating of 5* in both the 1996 and 2001 RAEs, or achieved 
a rating of 5* for the first time in the 2001 RAE and increased or maintained 
staff numbers between the 1996 and 2001 RAEs.  The funding is allocated 
pro rata to London-weighted mainstream QR for the departments 
concerned; 
 
• Research Capability Fund.  This was new for 2003-04 and is allocated in 
proportion to the number of research academic staff in departments in 
specified emerging disciplines that scored 3a or 3b in the 2001 RAE, 
weighted according to the cost weight for the UoA; and, 
 
• Charity Support Fund.  This was new for 2006-07 and is allocated with 
reference to eligible charity research income for disciplines rated 4 and 
above, and 3a and 3b for those receiving grant from the Research 
Capability Fund, together with the volume of charity research income from 
the 2005 Research Activity Survey. 
 
Public research funds are provided under a dual support system whereby the 
research funding provided by HEFCE is intended to support the cost of the 
salaries of permanent academic staff, premises, libraries, and central computing 
costs.  The Research Councils provide funds for direct project costs and contribute 
to indirect project costs. 
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2.8 Moderation of teaching and research 
 
To help maintain stability, HEFCE has a policy of phasing in changes by 
moderating the allocations.  In general, no higher education institution will receive 
a reduction in resource for teaching and research in real terms compared with the 
equivalent, unmoderated figure for the previous year.  HEFCE does not provide 
moderation funding if it amounts to less than £100,000 per higher education 
institution.  HEFCE reviews its moderation policy annually. 
 
2.9 Calculation of standard resource 
 
In calculating a higher education institution’s standard resource, assumed FTEs 
are weighted according to price group, and for the institutional and student-related 
premiums.  The institutional and student-related premiums are expressed in FTE 
terms, and are calculated as a proportion either of the unweighted FTEs or of the 
FTEs weighted by price group.  This depends on whether the additional costs that 
the premiums seek to recognise vary according to subject. 
 
The price group weights are: 
 
group A – 4 
group B – 1.7 
group C – 1.3 
group D – 1. 
 
The other factors of which account is taken are that part-time students are 
weighted (10%) as a percentage of an FTE, foundation degrees are weighted 
(10%) as a percentage of an FTE, small higher education institutions that have a 
total student FTE of 1,000 or less are weighted on a sliding scale, historic 
buildings are weighted on a sliding scale to eligible institutions with buildings 
constructed before 1914, long courses of 45 weeks or more are given an 
additional weighting (25%), London weighting is applied depending on whether the 
higher education institution is inner (8%) or outer (5%) London, and institution-
specific weighting incorporates a premium for specialist institutions. 
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As stated previously, it can be seen that these factors are intended to reflect, at a 
high level, matters of which HEFCE believes account should be taken when 
considering how it should allocate funds to higher education institutions.  It does 
not seek to mirror individual higher education institutional activity, and neither can 
it.  Hence the overall requirement that funds made available by HEFCE may be 
used for any eligible activities.  This leaves higher education institutions free to 
determine how to allocate those funds internally. 
 
It is worth noting here that the price group weights quoted above are different from 
those applied by HEFCE in previous years.  It can be seen, therefore, that a higher 
education institution’s standard resource could change significantly purely as a 
result of changes introduced by HEFCE to its funding formula, even though the 
higher education institution’s course and subject offering remained exactly the 
same from year to year. 
 
2.10 Calculation of assumed fee income 
 
HEFCE calculates for each type of student an average assumed fee per FTE 
student.  This is then applied to the assumed FTE student numbers to derive the 
assumed fee income.  Apart from those students for whom the fee is regulated, it 
is clear that HEFCE’s assumptions do not reflect individual higher education 
institution practice, since higher education institutions are free to set their own fees 
in accordance with their perception of what the market will bear. 
 
The next chapter will review the way in which my own University allocated funds 
within the University, and seek to identify the potential problems of using a national 
formulaic approach. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BRUNEL UNIVERSITY’S RESOURCE ALLOCATION METHOD TO 2005/06 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the way in which my own University allocated the funds 
available to it up to the 2005/06 allocation round, and seeks to identify some of the 
problems caused by following, at an institutional level, the HEFCE national model. 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, HEFCE allocates a block grant to each higher education 
institution.  Such a block grant system requires a higher education institution to 
have a mechanism for determining the way in which the block grant will be 
distributed within the higher education institution.  The mechanism should be 
capable of ensuring that the higher education institution can implement its 
priorities as identified in its strategic plan and objectives. 
 
The method used by Brunel University to allocate its resources amongst 
departments mirrored that used by HEFCE to allocate its grant to higher education 
institutions.  It is worth noting that one of the general principles underpinning 
Brunel’s resource allocation policy was to distribute resources to academic 
departments in line with the basis on which they accrued to the University, and in 
accordance with SPARC (Strategic Planning and Resource Committee) policy.  
This is not uncommon amongst higher education institutions; indeed, on the basis 
of 81 responses I received to the questionnaire that I sent to all higher education 
institutions, some 73% use a HEFCE-based model to allocate resources within 
their institutions.  In reality, therefore, the allocation of resources across the 
University, and those higher education institutions using a HEFCE-based model, is 
related more to numbers of students than to the achievement of the University’s 
strategic objectives.  Despite this, some 71% of those higher education institutions 
using a HEFCE-based model believe it facilitates delivery of strategic objectives.   
 
This statement implies a degree of pro-activeness in the allocation of resources, 
and it is highly questionable as to whether a formula-driven approach to the 
allocation of resources can satisfy such a principle.  This dissertation seeks to 
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address this matter, but to do so requires an understanding of the way in which the 
University allocated the funds available to it. 
 
Brunel University’s allocation cycle for an academic year begins with an evaluation 
of the various funding councils’ allocation of grant notifications received around 
March time.  The University identifies those elements of grant funding that are 
available for general distribution, and which can be used, therefore, in the general 
resource allocation process, and also makes an assessment of the likely tuition 
fee income that will be received in the academic year in question.  The total of 
these is then used as the sum to be allocated to departments across the 
University. 
 
3.2 Allocation of teaching funds 
 
In determining the way in which the funds available for teaching were to be 
allocated, a model was run that calculated for each department the level of student 
activity in terms of module and credit counts.  These were then weighted, using 
HEFCE’s subject and student weightings, to arrive at a weighted student activity 
level.  It can be seen that for a higher education institution that follows the HEFCE 
model to allocate internally the resources available to it, any change that is 
introduced by HEFCE will have an immediate effect on the internal distribution of 
resources from one year to the next.  This is not conducive to effective planning; in 
fact, quite the contrary.  It could actually introduce significant instability from year 
to year, not particularly helpful in achieving effective financial management. 
 
These data were captured, out of necessity, as a snapshot from the student 
database in early December.  It can be seen, therefore, that the resultant 
allocations for the following academic year could not take account of any policy 
steers that may have been determined by, for example, SPARC, and neither could 
they take account of the appropriate level of funding required by any particular 
department.  The achievement of these principles could only be secured, 
therefore, by pro-active action on the part of those responsible for determining the 
final allocation of funds.  As the allocations were determined by a mechanistic 
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model, based on HEFCE’s national formula, it was impossible to deliver these two 
fundamental principles. 
 
3.3 Allocation of research funds 
 
The same mechanistic approach was taken in relation to the allocation of 
HEFCE’s research grant, whereby the allocation process mirrored the same 
national formula used by HEFCE to determine the distribution of research grant 
funding to higher education institutions.  Whilst such an approach will distribute 
funds on the basis of current activity, it is extremely difficult for it to take account of 
the two guiding principles of strategic policy steers and appropriate levels of 
funding. 
 
3.4 Application of levies 
 
Having determined these departmental allocations on the basis of a mechanistic 
formula, the University then levied departments for the costs of academic support 
services, for example, Library, and also for space occupancy.  The result was a 
net allocation that supported the pay and non-pay expenditure of each 
department.  It was possible for a department to increase the funds available to it 
by demonstrating that it could secure additional income through either charging 
higher fees than the base fee levels assumed in the model, and/or by the 
generation of other income through, for example, consultancy work. 
 
3.5 Non-pay costs 
 
Once the net allocations had been determined, the costs associated with the 
employment of the current levels of staffing were computed, and the difference 
between the two was available to fund non-pay costs.  It is probably evident that 
when setting non-pay spending plans, departmental heads had no option other 
than to produce proposed spending levels for the constituent elements of the non-
pay budget that did not exceed the sum available.  Whether they bore any 
relationship to the level required to run their departments effectively, or to deliver 
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service improvements or contributions to the achievement of the University’s 
strategic objectives was, quite frankly, in the ‘lap of the Gods’. 
 
3.6 Potential consequences of the HEFCE-based method 
 
This can be evidenced by the fact that the calculation of HEFCE’s block grant for 
teaching is based on high level assumptions, one significant example being the 
use of just four price categories for different subjects.  Whilst this can be seen to 
be consistent with a block grant allocation system, it can also be seen that the 
result of a higher education institution allocating the grant across the higher 
education institution using a similar system could result in some subjects that are 
expensive to deliver being funded at the same level as others that are less 
expensive.  This has the effect of some subjects receiving funding at a potentially 
lower level than the cost of provision. 
 
The effect of the use of such a funding model within a higher education institution 
could be that decisions relating to subject offerings may be taken on purely 
financial grounds, these grounds being based on the outcomes produced from the 
operation of a high level funding model.  In extremis, it could be argued that the 
adoption by higher education institutions of HEFCE’s funding model could actually 
contribute to the withdrawal of subject offerings and/or the closure of departments, 
with potentially adverse consequences for the economy. 
 
Such a process can be seen, from a human behavioural perspective, to be at 
variance with the delivery of stated objectives, and can only lead to heighten 
disillusionment amongst the academic community, since it offers no route whereby 
departments can secure additional resources other than through growth in the 
student population.  This is exactly what happened at Brunel, and there was 
significant resentment amongst the academic community about the way in which 
funds were allocated to departments via the use of a mechanistic model. 
 
In fact, if the University’s additional resources for a particular year remained static, 
or worse still decreased, there was no way that any improvements or 
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developments could be delivered other than possibly by those departments that 
had grown their student activity level. 
 
As stated previously, increases in student activity levels may be completely at 
variance with the areas in which the University wishes to focus its future 
development, perhaps for the purposes of securing higher RAE outcomes in the 
future.  It was almost impossible, therefore, for a department whose student 
activity level remained constant to be able to find the necessary funds to 
implement a strategy that would deliver higher RAE outcomes.  As the resource 
allocation model was based primarily on student activity levels, it was very difficult 
indeed for any department that was not growing its student population to find the 
additional resources necessary to enable it to improve its research and/or teaching 
performance. 
 
Brunel University has a stated objective to become more research-led, although it 
did not have, until recently, any policy on minimum entry standards.  Under the 
mechanistic resource allocation model it can be seen that, so long as a 
department recruited additional students, that department stood to secure a higher 
proportion of the available resources, all other things being equal.  This introduced 
yet another undesirable consequence of the mechanistic resource allocation 
model. 
 
Not only was it possible for a department with students of lower academic ability to 
secure a greater share of available resources, but it could also be the case that a 
department that was not seen as critical to the achievement of the University’s 
stated objective to become research-led could, nevertheless, continue to secure a 
greater share of resources simply by continuing to grow its student numbers.  This 
at the expense of a department that may be seen as critical to the achievement of 
the University’s stated objective, but which could not grow its student population. 
 
It is of little surprise, therefore, that many academics became frustrated with what 
they saw as two opposing objectives.  On the one hand they were being asked to 
secure better RAE outcomes, but on the other hand, they were not being provided 
with the means of achieving such an outcome because the resource allocation 
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model recognised only student population growth, irrespective of whether that 
growth was in the areas identified as critical to the future of the University, and 
also because there was no way that a department that had historically had a small 
share of the resources could secure the additional resources necessary to raise its 
research grading. 
 
The use of a mechanistic resource allocation model that has no way of pro-actively 
addressing the legitimate needs of departments that are seen as critical to the 
future success of the University, and that contribute to the achievement of the 
University’s stated objectives, may be seen as an abrogation of the responsibility 
of senior management, and one that may contribute significantly to the 
disillusionment of the academic community. 
 
Indeed, the potentially undesirable effects of changes introduced by HEFCE can 
create a destabilising position within a higher education institution that follows the 
HEFCE model.  A very good example is the change in subject weightings 
introduced by HEFCE for the 2004-05 allocation round.  For my own University, 
this could have resulted in a reduction in funding of some £1 million for the 
Department of Information Systems and Computing, representing some 20% of its 
income, simply because HEFCE decided to change its subject weightings.  Such 
an outcome cannot be seen as rational, and it is extremely unlikely that any 
department could cope with a 20% year on year cut in its funding.  This type of 
practice is bound to introduce further antagonism amongst the academic 
community against the use of a mechanistic model. 
 
3.7 Alternative allocation scenarios 
 
This dissertation has referred previously to the way in which the University’s model 
levied departments for the costs of academic support services.  It did this by 
relating the levy to the usage of the service or facility.  Such an approach may be 
perfectly rational in the context of the need to apportion expenditure across cost 
centres, the accountant’s dream, but it has been argued by many within the 
University that it had the effect of disincentivising individuals to make use of a 
service or facility. 
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A good example is the use of a Library.  My own University and, I suspect, most 
other higher education institutions, would encourage staff and students to make 
the maximum possible use of Library facilities.  If one has a regime that then seeks 
to increase the levy on a department if its use of the facility increases, there is a 
direct disincentive introduced to make the most use of that facility.  That potential 
outcome cannot be in the best interests of either the higher education institution or 
its students if the policy steer is to encourage the maximum use of the facility. 
 
This is another area that has the capacity to cause significant friction within higher 
education institutions, and one where there is a serious misalignment between the 
policy steer and the adverse financial outcome of following that steer.  Whilst such 
a levying regime may suit the needs of accountants, it should not interfere with the 
delivery of the higher education institution’s policy objectives.  A serious review of 
this practice, perhaps along the lines of the cost of such services being treated as 
a single levy before determining the funds available to individual departments, may 
yield beneficial results.  Whilst it would be necessary, in this example, for the Head 
of Library Services to be able to support the level of resources required to run the 
Library, if the cost of providing the service were taken as a charge at the higher 
education institutional level, there would be no disincentive in using the Library to 
its maximum potential. 
 
As part of this research, and also to inform the debate within the University 
regarding the applicability of the HEFCE-based model to secure the achievement 
of the University’s strategic objectives, I carried out analyses to compare the 
allocation of resources across academic departments for the academic year 
2004/05 using three scenarios: 
 
Scenario 1: existing allocation method (see annex B); 
Scenario 2: no levy for Library and Media Services (see annex C); and, 
Scenario 3: no levy for Library, Media and Academic Services (see annex D). 
 
The results are summarised in annex E.  It will be noted that, were the three areas 
of activity to be funded by means of a top-slicing of funds rather than on a levy 
basis, there would be a shift of resources from the Faculty of Technology and 
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Information Systems to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences.  Such a shift of 
resources would be particularly important for the Faculty of Arts and Social 
Sciences given its relative share of the total available resources.  The availability 
of these additional resources could have a significant effect on the continued 
viability of subject areas within the Faculty. 
 
It should be noted that the revised approach would have no effect whatsoever on 
the total amount of resource made available to the three areas of activity, but it 
would have a significant effect on the distribution of resources across the 
academic areas.  It may not be altogether surprising, therefore, that the allocation 
model was viewed by many academics within the University as unfair, and not 
supportive of the University’s stated objectives. 
 
The next chapter reviews the theory of Rationalism, one of the two theories 
chosen for consideration as part of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THEORY OF RATIONALISM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the theory of rationalism, one of the two theories that are 
reviewed in this dissertation.  The chapter identifies the key principles of this 
approach, particularly in terms of the way in which the human relations school 
focuses on the rational nature of human behaviour, leading to the notion that 
rational or reasoned models can be adopted, therefore, when considering financial 
management systems. 
 
When looking at the behaviour of organisations one is faced with the problem that 
their composite behaviour involves multiple types of rationality.  Concepts used in 
the contexts of multiple types of rationality are necessarily ambiguous, and 
theories ignoring the full range of types of rationality are necessarily partial.  
Richard Hartwig (1978) propounded the central thesis that the five types of 
rationality described by Paul Diesing (1962a) could be used as a comprehensive 
framework of ideal types around which to organise administrative theory.  Our 
explicit or implicit understanding of the nature of rationality affects the meanings of 
the words we use, and an improved understanding of the different modes of 
rationality may help academics and practitioners alike to clarify their language and 
their theories. 
 
Paul Diesing's (1962b) analysis is directed against the view, common to many 
social theories, that rationality is identical with efficiency: technical rationality being 
the efficient achievement of a single goal, economic rationality being the maximum 
achievement of a plurality of goals and no other types of rationality being admitted. 
Such a conception of rationality is severely limited as the criterion of efficiency is 
applicable only to means, not ends, and thus the most basic decisions are not 
subject to selection or choice by rational procedures.  Diesing defined rationality in 
terms of effectiveness, it being defined as a wider concept than efficiency, and 
referring to the successful production of any kind of value. 
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Diesing distinguishes between three aspects of rationality viz. substantial, 
functional and a third aspect deduced by abstraction from the other two.  That is, 
since decisions are made according to principles, and organised structures 
embody principles of order, principles can also be thought of as rational. 
 
A decision or action is substantially rational when it takes account of the 
possibilities and limitations of a given situation, and reorganises it so as to 
produce, or increase, or preserve, some good.  This definition includes two points: 
the decision must be an effective response to the situation in that it produces 
some possible good, and the effectiveness must be based on intelligent insight 
rather than on luck.  An organisation is functionally rational when it is so structured 
as to produce, or increase, or preserve, some good in a consistent, dependable 
fashion. The consistently good results must be based primarily on an internal 
structure that is able to continue effective operation through variations of 
personnel and through changes of environment. 
 
4.2 Types of Rationality 
 
The five types of rationality were identified as being the outcomes of what S. C. 
Pepper (1958) calls 'natural selective systems'.  That is, through the largely 
unconscious decisions of millions of people, choice is exercised on cultural traits - 
techniques, rules, beliefs, and values. 
 
Technical rationality appears in actions undertaken in order to achieve a given 
end.  The means-end construct is fundamental to technical rationality, and also to 
the closely related form of economic rationality, they both being concerned with 
efficiency.  Organisations that achieve their ends efficiently are functionally 
rational, while decisions leading to efficient goal achievement are substantially 
rational.  The best means to an end is that which makes the greatest contribution 
at the least cost, but this cannot be determined until comparative costs have been 
set. The basic principle of technical rationality is 'adapt means to ends'. 
 
This principle is also applicable to economic rationality, where it is more usefully 
put in terms of the principle of economising.  Economising is an evaluation and 
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selection of ends, and it occurs when two or more ends are in competition with 
each other.  For example, " Should I do this or that?" or  “What order of priority 
shall we assign these tasks in case we are unable to do all of them?" 
Economising is necessary when the achievement of one end implies the sacrifice 
of another, and economising is possible only to the extent that ends are 
comparable on some scale.  Economic progress facilitates economising by 
increasing the alternativeness of ends through the removal of moral limitations on 
ends and on the use of means, and by the development of media, measurement 
and comparison. 
 
Social rationality is the rationality of social systems.  A social system is an 
organisation of cultural roles, including expectations, obligations and ideals.  Only 
by sharing a common social system that provides individuals with complementary 
roles can people understand and relate to one another.  Integration is a logical 
precondition for the successful completion of any social action, and an integrated 
social system is thus a rational one as it is effective in making action possible and 
meaningful. 
 
Socially oriented decision making attempts to change personalities and social 
relations in the direction of greater fundamental harmony and stability. The means-
end scheme is essentially irrelevant, because neither means nor ends can be 
treated as fixed or independent, let alone measurable.  In contrast to a maximising 
decision, which begins with given ends, the integrative approach treats ends as 
symbolic of hidden values, fears, strains etc.  Means and ends may change 
unpredictably in the course of problem solving, and only very general goals such 
as integration or tension reduction are at all relevant.  Social and economic 
rationality are thus clearly opposed in many respects, yet each form of reason 
presupposes, and is entirely dependent upon, the other.  For example, the 
integration made possible in social organisations and in personalities provides the 
stability that enables calculation and technically rational action to occur. 
 
Legal rationality is the rationality of fundamental rules.  The fundamental rules in a 
society may consist of the constitution and the laws, the moral order and perhaps 
the status system.  Rules serve to produce predictability and formal order.  
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Legalism occurs only in the presence of clear and permanent differences of 
interest.  In tightly integrated social systems, conflict is avoided without the need 
for intricate, formal rules.  Indeed, from the standpoint of the integrative ideal, law 
is a distinctly inferior solution because it stabilises conflicts without resolving them.  
Nevertheless, a legal order can provide solutions and prevent disputes when other 
methods fail.  This is its claim to rationality. 
 
Political rationality is the rationality of decision making structures.  Political 
decisions are concerned with the preservation and improvement of decision 
structures.  All decisions occur within some sort of decision structure, but the 
identifying characteristic of political decisions is that they have decision structures 
as their special subject matter. 
 
There is a sense in which political rationality encompasses the other forms of 
rationality.  If political decisions are concerned with decision structures, then they 
are also concerned with what decision criteria are to prevail in different areas of 
life, for example, a policy decision to keep an unprofitable mine open may be in 
contradiction of economic rationality, but in line with social rationality. 
 
Diesing concluded his book with an overall definition of reason.  “Such a definition 
must have two parts: one to correspond to the rationality of organisations 
(functional rationality) and the other corresponding to the rationality of decisions 
(substantial rationality).”  Functional rationality is seen simply as order, and 
rational norms are therefore principles of order.  Technical rationality is an order of 
production.  Economic rationality is an order of measurement and comparison of 
values.  Social rationality is an order of interdependence or solidarity that exists 
when people understand one another, act together and share common 
experiences.  Legal rationality is an order of availability.  It specifies which 
resources are available to each legal entity and which persons correspond to 
which actions and roles.  Legal rationality exists when each person knows what he 
can do and must do.  Finally, there is the political rationality of discussion and 
decision.  Structures of this type are rational to the extent that they adequately 
provide for the gathering and processing of information, for taking decisions and 
for checking the effectiveness of such decisions. 
 31 
 
Now if functional rationality is order, Diesing (1962c) writes, substantial rationality 
can most simply be conceived as the making of order, or creativity.  Substantially 
rational decisions of various types ultimately create the different orders of 
functional rationality.  That is, under favourable conditions, economically rational 
decisions will (indirectly) create a viable economic order: legal decisions will 
(indirectly) create legal order: and so forth.  Thus, economic order arises out of the 
constant measurement and comparison of values which occurs as individuals seek 
the most desirable alternatives: legal order arises, given propitious circumstances, 
as a result of the continual application of rules to cases: and so on. 
 
All five types of rationality in decision making, on both the functional and 
substantial levels, are to be found in administrative behaviour.  Although each 
mode of practical reason is related to, and is dependent upon, the others, each still 
reflects a distinct and independent source of evaluative criteria, and there are 
many situations in which the criteria of technical, economic, social, legal and 
political rationality conflict.  The study of complete organisations necessarily 
involves multiple aspects and types of rationality, which means that an entirely 
successful analysis and evaluation of rationality would require the existence of an 
integrated theory of the social sciences. 
 
4.3 Policy Analysis 
 
Policy analysis normally assumes the perspective of substantial rationality.  The 
purpose of policy analysis is to define, and subsequently achieve, certain 
objectives without causing unacceptable changes in background variables.  A 
bureaucracy, however, is simply a means to an end, and one organisation is as 
good as another.  Most students of bureaucracy take the organisation as given 
and attempt to improve its performance.  Thus they tend to adopt the perspective 
of functional rationality.  This is important because it complements the necessarily 
partial perspective of policy analysis. 
 
It is not uncommon for analysts to consider only the substantial or only the 
functional levels of rationality, or to confuse the two.  Thus, as Mouzelis (1967) 
concluded, the supposedly integrative character of organisation theory disappears 
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when one moves from the individual level to consideration of the organisation as a 
whole. 
 
The human relations school focuses its attention on the informal aspects of the 
organisational structure, and human behaviour is predominantly explained in terms 
of sentiments, motivations and personal values and goals that are often in conflict 
with formal regulations and organisational objectives.  But this emphasis on 
sentiments minimises the importance of rational problem solving activities in the 
organisation.  It neglects the problems of planning and co-ordination, the fact that 
an organisation is predominantly a system of consciously co-ordinated activities 
geared towards the achievement of collective goals.  It relegates the formal 
structure, with its problems of design, to the background by treating it as an 
external variable of the informal system, not to be studied in itself. 
 
On the other hand, those social disciplines that take into consideration the rational 
aspects of human behaviour go to the other extreme.  They give us an ideal, non-
empirical picture of a human actor; totally rational, with no bounds whatsoever to 
his capacities for computation and problem solving.  The economic man, when he 
makes a choice in pursuit of a goal, is supposed to know in an omniscient way all 
the possible alternatives of action, be able to foresee the set of consequences 
which will ensue from the eventual choice of each alternative (or the probabilities 
of the appearance of each consequence), and have a complete and consistent 
system of preferences (a utility function), enabling him to rank all consequences, 
from the most to the least preferred, thus making an optimal choice. 
 
The model above is not the way in which people actually decide, but the way in 
which they should decide if they were one hundred per cent rational and if their 
computational capacities were unlimited.  As to the classical management theory, 
rational elements are analysed in a similar fashion.  Whether the universalists 
consider structure designing or other management problems (budgeting, planning, 
etc.), they are not preoccupied with finding out how the manager really takes 
decisions.  They are rather preoccupied with how the manager ought to take 
decisions if he wants optimal results. 
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It can be seen that a polarisation is evident in the various approaches to 
organisational behaviour.  The human relations school neglects the rational 
aspects of behaviour whilst the economist and management science theorist take 
into consideration rational elements.  But, as they are not empirically minded, they 
do not only confine rationality to the top of the organisational hierarchy, but they 
also neglect the non-rational elements of behaviour that drastically limit ideal 
rationality. 
 
Carsberg (1975a) believes very strongly that scientific methods, in the form of a 
‘model-building approach’, will greatly assist in helping management to solve its 
problems and make decisions more effectively.  He views the management of an 
enterprise as the undertaking of a sequence of activities, which are repeated in a 
cyclical manner:- 
 
Figure 1    A simplified management cycle 
 
 
In a new enterprise, senior management must first determine an objective for their 
operations.  This would be followed by a consideration of the details of activities 
that might be undertaken during a selected period.  An assessment would be 
made of the likely level of resources that are required, and all these factors would 
be combined to produce a number of feasible plans, that is, the identification of 
those activities that could be carried out within the resources available. 
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It would then be necessary to choose from the various feasible alternatives the 
optimal plan, that is, the plan that best satisfies the objectives of the enterprise.  
Once this has been achieved, one would move into the control phase.  The 
detailed consequences of the chosen plan are expressed in the form of budgets 
showing the quantities of resources required and corresponding income and 
expenditure.  Actual resuIts are recorded in a similar form and compared with the 
estimates in order to identify differences and assess the reasons for them.  
Managers thus obtain information that may help them in the formulation or 
implementation of the next plan. 
 
In practice the process of management is not as straightforward as the above 
description suggests.  The selection of the optimal plan may be viewed as an 
iterative process rather than a simple sequence of actions as described above. 
 
The essence of the scientific method is well captured in the expression 'the model-
building approach'.  An organisation applies the model building approach if it 
decides first what it wants to achieve, and then devises an expression for the 
relationship between these things and matters that can be influenced directly by its 
decisions.  Such an expression is known as a model.  Whenever a decision is 
taken, some relationship must be assumed at least implicitly.  Only if the 
assumptions about the relationships governing the effect of business decisions are 
made explicit, however, can a consensus be reached as to whether they are the 
best possible.  Even then, the assumptions must often remain the subject of 
considerable uncertainty.  In that case a decision need not, and normally should 
not, be made on the basis of one set of assumptions.  The model-building 
approach provides a good basis for exploring the effect for a particular decision of 
different assumptions.  It provides a sound basis for decision taking, that is, it 
provides a rigorous framework within which managers may exercise their 
judgment (Carsberg, 1975b). 
 
Anderson (1991) proposed that the best method for analysing human cognitive 
behaviour lies in the analysis of the task rather than in attempting to analyse the 
methods used by the human to solve the problem.  He implied that researchers 
had confused the analysis of tasks with the analysis of mechanisms because of 
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the existence of signature data, a subject-universal invariant measure of 
performance for some task or group of tasks.  He argued that the appearance of 
these data had been taken as evidence indicating constraints on the architecture 
of human cognition, rather than indicating constraints of the task.  He proposed 
three advantages that rational analysis provided: 
 
• an understanding of the nature of the problem can provide strong guidance 
in the proposal of possible mechanisms; 
 
• the task domain provides a rationale for constraining the architecture; and, 
 
• mechanism-focused modelling faces critical indeterminacies that can affect 
computation or memory mechanisms such as serial versus parallel 
processing.  Analysis of the task domain need not consider these directly. 
 
Anderson proposed the following six steps for describing the rational analysis 
approach to the behaviour of a cognitive system: 
 
• specify precisely the goals of the cognitive system; 
 
• develop a formal model of the environment to which the system is adapted; 
 
• make the minimal assumptions about computational costs; 
 
• derive the optimal behavioural function considering the above criteria; 
 
• examine the empirical literature to see if the predictions of the behavioural 
function are confirmed; and, 
 
• if predictions are off, iterate. 
 
Porter’s approach (1980) was directed to the way in which organisations could 
achieve long-term competitive advantage, and was based on surgical precision, 
the dissection of the vital organs of companies.  He asserted (Porter, 1987) that 
 36 
 
strategic thinking rarely occurs spontaneously and that, without guidelines, few 
managers know what constitutes strategic thinking.  His work set about 
constructing those guidelines, work that brought him into conflict with a number of 
other leading thinkers.  Indeed, Henry Mintzberg, the champion of spontaneity and 
intuition, has been critical of Porter’s ‘enthusiasm for generic strategies and 
checklists of all kinds’ (Mintzberg, 1994). 
 
Porter managed to absorb the concepts of, on the one hand, competitive 
advantage being achieved by organisations adapting to their particular 
circumstances and, on the other, competitive advantage being based on the 
simple principle that the more in-tune and aware of a market a company is, the 
more competitive it can be.  By analysing a number of companies, he developed 
generic strategies.  Whilst not being an instant template for competitive advantage, 
Porter insisted that, though the generic strategies existed, it was up to each 
organisation to select carefully which were most appropriate to them, and at which 
particular time. 
 
Porter’s generic strategies for competitive advantage were: 
 
• cost leadership – a firm sets out to become the low cost producer in its 
industry; 
 
• differentiation – a firm seeks to be unique in its industry along some 
dimensions that are widely valued by buyers; and, 
 
• focus – the choice of a narrow competitive scope within an industry.  The 
focus strategy has two variants: the cost focus whereby a firm seeks a cost 
advantage in its target segment, and the differentiation focus whereby a 
firm seeks differentiation in its target segment. 
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A five competitive forces model used to analyse an industry backed up these 
generic strategies.  The five forces are: 
 
• competitive rivalry – if entry to an industry is easy then competitive rivalry is 
likely to be high; 
 
• power of suppliers – suppliers are essential for the success of an 
organisation; 
 
• power of buyers – buyers or customers can exert influence and control over 
an industry in circumstances where there is little differentiation over the 
product and substitutes can be found easily, where customers are sensitive 
to price, or where switching to another product is not costly; 
 
• threat of substitutes – if there are alternative products that customers can 
purchase over your product that offer the same benefit for the same or less 
price, the threat of substitute is high when the price of that substitute 
product falls, it is easy for consumers to switch from one substitute product 
to another, or buyers are willing to substitute; and, 
 
• threat of new entrant - the threat of a new organisation entering the industry 
is high when it is easy for an organisation to enter the industry, that is, entry 
barriers are low. 
 
The above five main factors are key factors that influence industry performance; 
hence it is common sense and practical to find out about these factors before you 
enter the industry. 
 
Porter advocated the use of a ‘value chain’ analysis of a company’s internal 
processes and the interactions between different elements of the organisation to 
determine how and where value is added.  Porter argued that viewing everything a 
company does in terms of its overall competitiveness is a crucial step to becoming 
more competitive. 
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For managers, Porter’s framework may be considered seductive, clear and the 
logic irrefutable.  The trouble is that, while Porter suggests that the model should 
only be used to stimulate thinking, organisations often regard it as a direct route to 
competitive advantage. 
 
It is perhaps interesting to note that, in a volume of over 500 pages, it is easy to 
miss Porter’s one reference to human resource management, it occupying only 
two paragraphs. 
 
4.4 Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
 
In the early 1960s a Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) was 
introduced to the United States Department of Defense.  Its intellectual kinship to 
the rational model is clear from the summary of its requirements: 
 
• identify and examine goals and objectives in each major area of 
government activity; 
 
• analyse how well a given program meets these objectives; 
 
• measure total program costs for several years; 
 
• formulate long-range goals and policies beyond the year in which the 
budget is submitted; 
 
• analyse alternatives to find the most effective and least expensive means of 
reaching program objectives; and, 
 
• make these procedures part of the program and budget review. 
 
There is an emphasis on the analysis of goals and programmes and on the 
measurement of costs and benefits for a multi-year period.  This technique was an 
attempt to rationalise policy-making but it has several constraints. 
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These are that: 
 
• the data collection and data analysis requirements of a comprehensive 
PPBS are huge.  Much of the data is usually not immediately available from 
'traditional' systems of gathering policy-relevant information.  Data on 
interactions between programmes were (and usually are) particularly 
difficult to come by; 
 
• the relationship between values, goals and operationally defined targets is 
far from simple.  The intellectual operations represented by box 1 in Figure 
2 are actually both subtle and contentious; and, 
 
• the existence of a consensus over values, and the relevant weight to be 
given to them, is exceptional rather than normal.  Thus to 'identify and 
examine goals and objectives in each major area of activity' is not a simple 
process of detached analysis.  Economic and technical rationality can be 
applied after goals have been established; they offer no formula for 
deciding whether one value is more important than another.  That 
fundamental decision is a non-rational one, typically entailing distinctively 
political argument and bargaining. 
 
The Study Group on Local Authority Management Structures (1972) raised the 
issue of corporate planning in local government and assumed two things.  These 
were that: 
 
• rationality consists of establishing priorities and allocating resources 
between them; and, 
 
• the values of the authorities' activities can, and should be, weighed 
together. 
 
When looking at the allocation of resources in a limited situation, the Study Group 
report (1972) commented “In many authorities this process is still totally irrational.  
Committee estimates are cut all round in order to keep within what is regarded as 
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an acceptable level of total expenditure, with no attempt made to evaluate the 
relative consequences of cuts in different services which those estimates 
represent”. 
 
The chief emphases of the corporate approach were usually on the setting of the 
objectives of the authority in relation to the needs, present and forecast, of the 
individuals, groups and organisations that live and work within its area, the 
consideration, evaluation and taking of decisions on alternative plans for achieving 
those objectives, the setting of targets as a guide to action, and the feedback of 
data on performance so that objectives, plans or action can all be modified. 
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Figure 2    The rational model 
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The emphasis on increasing the attention paid to policy formulation and forward 
planning represents a now familiar echo of the 'rational-comprehensive' model. 
 
Like PPBS, corporate planning had its origins in the management processes of 
large (United States) private sector companies.  Experience of applying these 
approaches to real life policy problems seemed to indicate some common 
limitations.  These were that these approaches offer only limited help in 
understanding the nature of values and value conflicts, they do not seem to deal 
directly with the questions of the distribution and exercise of power, and for the 
analysis of complex policy problems they are very data-hungry and calculation-
intensive.  These may cause problems for laypersons who need to evaluate PPBS 
etc. analyses. 
 
4.5 Factors affecting decision making 
 
Herbert Simon (1957a) insisted “organisations should be analysed primarily in 
terms of decision making, and analysts ought to direct their attentions to the 
problem of gauging levels of rationality in organisational decision making”.  He 
emphasised the objective of increasing the economic rationality of organisations 
and defined rationality in terms of efficiency.  He recognised the psychological and 
other limitations on the rationality of isolated individuals.  Simon, in his effort to 
account for both the rational and non-rational aspects of organisational behaviour, 
tried to construct a model of rational choice combining realism and analytic rigour, 
a conceptual framework that could refer to' the actual properties of human beings, 
and at the same time retain some of the formal clarity of the economic model'. 
 
The way in which a member of an organisation actually solves problems is very 
different from the one described in the economic model.  In reality, perfectly 
rational behaviour does not exist; rationality is always limited and it is precisely by 
the serious consideration of such limits that the link between the rational and the 
non-rational can be achieved.  Indeed, the environment of the decision-maker can 
be seen as a set of premises upon which his decisions will be based.  Simon 
distinguishes two kinds of decision premises.  There are factual premises subject 
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to empirical testing for the establishment of their validity, and value premises 
which are not subject to such tests.  Roughly speaking the latter have to do with 
the choice of the ends of action, the former with the choice of means.  From this 
point of view a rational decision can be seen as the right conclusion reached from 
these two kinds of premises. 
 
In the economic model of perfect rationality, the decision-maker is supposed to 
have a priori a full repertory of all the factual premises (complete knowledge of 
alternatives and consequences) and the value premises (utility function or 
preference ordering) that are relevant to his problem.  In reality these premises are 
not given, the decision-maker has to search for them.  In the process of this 
search there are all sorts of limitations which reduce the quality and quantity of the 
premises on which he has to base his decisions.  For Simon such limitations fall 
into three categories: 
 
• skills, habits and reflexes are more or less unconscious, and determine 
automatically an individual's performance and the decisions, which precede 
it.  It is precisely these types of limitation, most evident on the operative 
level of an organisation, with which Taylorism was preoccupied (Taylor, 
1911).  The various techniques of early scientific management can be seen 
as efforts to increase productivity by widening the boundaries of rational 
behaviour on the workshop level; 
 
• a second group of constraints to rationality derive from the motivations, 
values and loyalties of the individual.  In an organisational context, for 
example, an individual's strong identification with a certain group whose 
values diverge from organisational values might limit the individual's rational 
behaviour (when rationality is judged by organisational standards and 
goals).  This sort of limitation was the main preoccupation of the human 
relations school; and, 
 
• rational behaviour or rational decision making is limited by the amount of 
basic knowledge and information available. It is precisely this third class of 
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limitations that have been most neglected in the study of organisations, and 
which come to the centre of attention in organisation theory. 
 
All the above limitations put boundaries to, or delineate in some way, the area in 
which rationality can be exercised.  They determine which alternatives, of all the 
possible ones, can realistically be considered, to what extent the consequences of 
such alternatives can be predicted, and how accurately the evaluation and ranking 
of the predicted consequences can be effected. 
 
If we now look at the same problem of limitations from the decision-maker's point 
of view, we may say that his choice is always exercised with respect to a limited 
approximate and simplified model of reality.  His behaviour is rational or irrational 
not in an absolute sense, but according to his definition of the situation.  Indeed his 
subjective frame of reference allows him the consideration of only a few of the 
decision premises.  In turn, these limited premises perceived by the individual are 
themselves the outcome of psychological and sociological processes.  Finally, on 
the basis of such premises, the decision-maker does not search for the optimal 
decision in the economic sense, but simply for a satisfactory one.  He is not the 
maximising man of economics but the satisfying man: that is to say, as soon as he 
finds an alternative which will lead him to the attainment of his main goal and 
which, at the same time, satisfies a number of auxiliary requirements, he will 
choose it, thus abandoning the search for the best alternative. 
 
4.5.1 Bounded Rationality 
 
Simon (1956) described satisficing in the context that people will tend to make 
choices based on their most important current needs rather than through a rational 
process.  Thus, for example, when people are stressed, they will choose the first 
thing that will reduce that stress, even though it may cause problems later.  This is 
because people act within bounded rationality (Simon, 1957b), limited as they are 
by their finite mental capabilities in an infinite universe. 
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Simon (1991) was critical of Anderson’s proposed rational analysis, and he 
believed that it was misdirected on the basis of three arguments: 
 
• humans are not optimal and only in some cases locally optimal; 
 
• assumptions made by cognitive modellers about how an agent performs 
architectural tasks, which Anderson labels unnecessary, are subsequently 
tacitly repeated by him in his analyses; and, 
 
• data regarding human behaviour on isomorphic task domains explicitly 
denies the theory. 
 
Simon expressed the view that, while rational analysis can yield some information 
about cognition, such as that a solution can be found, the particular solution found 
by particular subjects cannot necessarily be found.  Without a uniquely defined 
solution, subject-specific strategies cannot be determined nor studied.  Simon 
suggested that his notion of bounded rationality which is used to designate models 
of rational choice that take into account the cognitive limitations of both knowledge 
and cognitive capacity, better describes agent behaviours than Anderson’s optimal 
rationality approach. 
 
In considering bounded rationality, Simon suggested that researchers not limit 
their focus to signature data, but look for all the data they can in order to uncover 
the underlying processes.  Bounded rationality is a central theme in behavioural 
economics, it being concerned with the ways in which the actual decision making 
process influences the decisions that are eventually reached.  To this end, 
behavioural economics departs from one or more of the neoclassical assumptions 
underlying the theory of rational behaviour since, in neoclassical economic theory, 
it is assumed that decision makers, given their knowledge of utilities, alternatives, 
and outcomes, are able to compute which alternative will yield the greatest 
subjective (expected) utility. 
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4.5.2 Artificial Intelligence 
 
In this context, Simon determined that the best way to study these areas was 
through computer simulation modelling.  Simon concentrated on the development 
of heuristics, or rules of thumb, that humans use to solve geometry problems and 
that could be programmed into a computer.  In conjunction with Allen Newell, he 
developed a programming language that could mimic human memory processes, 
and in December 1955 they succeeded in inventing a ‘thinking machine’, a term 
that has become known as artificial intelligence. 
 
At that time, the digital computer was still in its infancy, but researchers and 
philosophers had been talking about using the still-crude device as an electronic 
brain, solving problems much as a human might.  Without the benefit of actually 
having a computer, Simon and Newell worked through their own version of a 
thinking machine and put it in a form that could be programmed into a computer.  
Although it took eight more months for them to develop a program called Logic 
Theorist that would run successfully on a computer, they had helped invent 
artificial intelligence, and their work has inspired generations of researchers to 
work in this area. 
 
Though many of the specific methods used by the pair have been superseded, a 
huge fraction of what we do today ties back to Newell and Simon's work.  
Language translation by machine, speech recognition, robotics; all embody or 
depend heavily on artificial intelligence.  Their view of artificial intelligence – that 
knowledge and information can be programmed into a computer – is one of the 
two principles that have come to dominate artificial intelligence research, the other 
being that intelligence can be expressed as formal logic. 
 
In the last decade or so, artificial intelligence has achieved great success with an 
approach that uses statistical tools rather than human-like reasoning.  By 
comparing large amounts of text for which translations are available in one or 
more languages, computers can often identify statistical associations between 
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words and phrases that can be used subsequently to guide translation by 
machine. 
 
One of the innovations of Simon and Newell (Simon, 1976) that remains to the 
present day is the concept of ‘search space’, a way of thinking about possible 
actions and reactions: establishing an objective, considering all the possible 
actions that could be taken, and then evaluating which actions are most likely at 
each step.  According to the information processing theories of Newell and Simon, 
human reasoning about problems such as these takes place via searching some 
problem space.  That search is controlled using the architecture of a production 
rule system. One way to test these assumptions would be to determine whether 
the human subject's verbal protocol can be reproduced using a production rule 
system appropriately tailored to the subject's representation of the problem. 
 
At least for some cognitive tasks we can provide information about what we are 
thinking by describing verbally what is going through our mind while performing the 
task. This type of data is referred to as a verbal protocol.  Newell and Simon 
pioneered and championed the use of verbal protocols.  They felt that the 
systematic collection of these types of observations could be used to test 
information processing models of human reasoning.  Of course, we may not 
always be able to access information relevant to a cognitive task that we are 
performing, for example, the understanding of spoken speech happens rapidly and 
usually without thinking about it.  In contrast, we may sometimes think aloud 
spontaneously when solving puzzles.  And verbal protocols have been used 
extensively in the development and design of expert systems. 
 
Having looked in some depth at the theory of rationalism, the next chapter will 
concentrate on modifications to the 'rational-comprehensive' model by examining 
incrementalist theory, that is, incrementalism. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THEORY OF INCREMENTALISM 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the theory of incrementalism, the second of the two 
theories reviewed in this dissertation.  It reviews the concept, inherent in terms of 
an incrementalist approach, that history offers the best guide to predicting the 
future and, therefore, is of greater use when considering financial management 
systems. 
 
The Oxford Dictionary defines rationalism as "rejection of doctrines not consonant 
with reason" but it does not intimate from whose point of view 'reason' is to be 
looked.  If one takes a general organisation, it is clearly made up of different 
disciplines, for example accountants, administrators, technical staff etc.  In many 
instances, especially where resources are limited or in decline, reason will mean 
different things to the members of the different disciplines within the organisation.  
In the case of higher education institutions, there are also specialists, for example, 
academics whose reason may be likely to conflict with that of the generalists. 
 
5.2 Management by Objectives 
 
The use of information systems in the rational process, for example, Program 
Evaluation Review Technique (PERT), seems to have become fixated on 
objectives due to the excessive dwelling on goals. Resources change objectives 
as much as the other way round.  Each analytical iteration, as well as every 
practical application, should teach us as much about what we prefer as about how 
much we put in.  Objectives are altered by resources, for we learn to choose by 
knowing what we cannot do as well as by what we might wish to try.  Ends and 
means are chosen simultaneously. 
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There is no denying the attractive aspects of information systems.  After all, 
analysis cannot be done without information.  A number of questions arise from 
this.  Isn't it better to manage by objectives rather than by procedures for which 
managers can hardly be held accountable?  Shouldn't budgeting be done by 
programmatic outputs instead of administrative inputs? 
 
Although there has been some scrutiny of these 'rational' information systems, 
they have not been compared critically as modes of problem solving.  It is 
assumed always that their strengths lie in assisting rational choice, and their 
weaknesses in coping with the irrational features that self-interest brings to policy-
making.  A promise underlies policy: if the actions we recommend are undertaken, 
the good or intended consequences rather than the bad or unintended ones may 
actually come about.  Since causal connections are strict, failure to match promise 
with performance is likely to be high, as is reluctance to acknowledge error. 
 
Objectives are kept vague and multiply to expand the range within which observed 
behaviour fits.  Goal substitution takes place as the consequences actually caused 
by programmes replace the objectives originally sought.  Goal displacement 
becomes the norm as an organisation seeks to make the variables it can control, 
its own efforts and processes, the objectives against which it is measured.  This is 
how organisations become justifiers of error instead of creators of knowledge.  On 
all sides, theoretical requirements are abandoned - by considering inputs or 
outputs alone - until there seems to be no error (and hence no truth), and it 
becomes impossible to learn from experience. 
 
Managing by objectives alone is better treated as a misguided effort to violate an 
analytic theorem - treating objectives apart from resources - than as a mode of 
analysis.  The trouble with experts is not only that they may not know what they 
can and should know, but also that they may pretend to know what is unknown.  
Routines like PERT risk becoming the problem for which they were created to be 
the solution.  Instead of discovering critical paths, they assume them, thus 
becoming the chief obstacle to undertaking a quest everyone now believes is over.  
The question never is whether there is a theory; there always is; but whether it is a 
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veneer, to mask error, or a hypothesis whose testing serves to uncover error.  
Economists call this a production function, specifying the mix of instruments or 
inputs that is expected (within some range of probability) to lead to the desired 
output.  Programme budgeting makes huge demands on theory that probably 
cannot be met.  Who is most misled by this, the proponents who sell these 
information systems or those who buy them, is debatable.  But if these systems 
represent the best in rational analysis, as many believe, and if this presumptuous 
rationality is doomed to failure, as it probably is, then the loser is policy analysis, 
with its idea of applying intelligence to policy problems. 
 
The tension between analysis, which seeks out error and promotes change, and 
organisation, which seeks stability and promotes its existing activities, is inevitable. 
Better information alone will not matter without incentives making it worthwhile for 
organisations to use it. 
 
To say that contemporary information systems are a-historical is to conclude that 
they increase the sources of error while decreasing the chances of correcting 
mistakes.  If history is abolished, nothing is settled.  Old quarrels become new 
conflicts.  Both calculation and conflict increase exponentially, the former 
worsening selection and the latter correction of error.  As the number of 
independent variables grows, because the past is assumed not to limit the future, 
ability to control the future declines.  As mistrust grows with conflict, willingness to 
admit, and hence to correct, error diminishes.  Doing without history is a little like 
abolishing memory, momentarily convenient perhaps, but ultimately embarrassing. 
 
The ideal a-historical information system is zero-base budgeting.  The past, as 
reflected in the budgetary base, is explicitly rejected.  Nothing is taken for granted, 
but everything is subject to searching scrutiny.  As a result, calculations become 
unmanageable. 
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5.3 Traditional budgeting principles 
 
By comparison, traditional budgeting is highly historical.  A budgetary base is the 
routinised retention of old solutions.  Clinging to last year's agreements is 
enormously economical of critical resources (particularly time and good 
interpersonal relations), which would be seriously impaired if all or most past 
agreements were re-examined yearly.  If there is a mechanism for holding on to 
adequate solutions and sequentially proceeding to solve remaining problems, 
which focus on increases and decreases to the base, knowledge is more likely to 
result.  Similarly, an agreement-producing process is more likely to work if past 
agreements can be retained, while the system works on unresolved issues.   
 
Analysis aims to bring information to bear on current decisions that do have future 
consequences.  Taking these consequences into account, acting now to do better 
later, is what all analysis is about.  Because prediction comes at a premium 
however, analysis uses history, what has been tried in the past, how past patterns 
have led to present problems, where past obligations limit future commitments, as 
a source of both limits and possibilities. 
 
Analysis uses the legacy of the past to make manageable the present, for creating 
a future is immensely more difficult when one simultaneously must invent a past. 
 
5.4 Incrementalism 
 
This is precisely what brought about the school of thought termed incrementalism, 
for its supporters propounded that history was the best guide to organisational 
policy making for the future.  Incrementalism is particularly associated with the 
name of an American academic, Charles Lindblom.  He (Lindblom, 1959) argued 
that his model was ‘both a better description of actual policy making and a better 
normative guide to how policies ought to be made than the rational-comprehensive 
model’.  When he originally put the model forward he did so with the assertion that 
the rational-comprehensive approach cannot be practised except for relatively 
simple problems, and even then only in a somewhat modified form.  He put 
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forward therefore an alternative approach to decision making which he called the 
method of successive limited comparisons.  Its features are compared in figure 3 
with those of the rational comprehensive model.
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Figure 3
Rational-Comprehensive Model  
 
 
1(a) Clarification of values or 
objectives is distinct from and 
usually pre-requisite to 
empirical analysis of 
alternative policies 
 
2(a) Policy formulation is therefore 
approached through means-
end analysis:  First the ends 
are isolated, and then the 
means to achieve them are 
sought 
 
3(a) The test of a ‘good’ policy is 
that it can be shown to be the 
most appropriate means to 
desired ends 
 
 
 
4(a) Analysis is comprehensive:  
every important relevant factor 
is taken into account 
 
Successive Limited Comparisons 
Model 
 
1 (b) Selection of value goals and 
empirical analysis of the 
needed action are not distinct 
from one another but are 
closely intertwined 
 
2(b) Since means and ends are not 
distinct, means-end analysis is 
often inappropriate or limited 
 
 
 
3(b) The test of a ‘good’ policy is 
typically that various analysts 
find themselves directly 
agreeing on a policy (without  
them agreeing that it is the 
most appropriate means to an 
agreed objective) 
 
4(b) Analysis is drastically limited:- 
(i) Important possible 
outcomes are neglected 
(ii) Important alternative 
potential policies are neglected 
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5(a) Theory is often heavily relied 
 upon 
 
 
(iii) Important affected 
values are neglected 
 
5(b) A succession of comparisons 
 greatly reduces or eliminates 
 reliance on theory
With later elaborations, the successive limited comparisons method has become 
known as incrementalism, the essential idea being that policy-making usually 
amounts to a continuation of past policies with the minimum of change 
(incremental change) necessary to meet new circumstances.  This, said Lindblom 
(1959), was the way in which real-world policy making was usually carried out, and 
with good reason.  It avoided ‘leaps into the dark’ and maximised the use of 
existing policy-making experience (precedent) and knowledge. 
 
Lindblom (1959) subsequently identified a further characteristic feature of policy-
making as being a bargaining process, which he labelled ‘partisan mutual 
adjustment’.  So common has this concept become among academic political 
scientists that it is sometimes referred to as ‘PMA’.  ‘Policy’ emerges from 
bargaining between groups with different aims, interests and values.  They do, 
however, share acceptance of the bargaining (PMA) process itself, as the least 
objectionable one for reaching practical decisions about current problems.  Thus, 
policy makers often do not realise they are creating new 'policies'.  Rather they are 
simply seeking to deal with each new problem as it thrusts itself on their attention.  
Aspirations and group interests are gradually adjusted as things go along. 
 
Incrementalism has been seen as the typical decision making process in pluralistic 
societies.  It is argued that it is a method by which societal decision making 
bodies, acting as coalitions of interest groups, can make cumulative decisions, and 
arrive at compromises that can be made to work.  They are the result of 'give and 
take' and might be thought of, in Diesing's terms, as an example of the operation 
of a distinctively political rationality. 
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Lindblom sees decisions based on consensus as avoiding some of the evils of 
undemocratic centralised decision making.  There has been criticism of this 
viewpoint from those who see incremental policies as likely to keep other power 
holders happy, but possibly by neglecting groups that are politically weak.  A not 
unlikely consequence of incremental policy making is that drastic changes are 
avoided.  This says nothing about whether such changes are socially necessary. 
 
There are two important elements in Lindblom's (1959) model to particularly note.  
The first is that only a limited range of alternatives - often those most familiar from 
recent experience - are usually considered by policy makers, and the second is 
that the resulting policy changes tend to be the least that are thought likely to 'get 
by' in the new situation. 
 
Both of these remind one of the view of the individual as a 'satisficer'.  Indeed, 
incrementalism as a descriptive theory of organisational behaviour is closely linked 
to satisficing as a theory of individual decision making, and (through the concept of 
partisan mutual adjustment) to pluralism as a theory of power in political society. 
 
According to Anthony Hopwood (1974), because assembling a budget for a large 
organisation is a massive endeavour, and the persons engaged in the process 
have, of necessity, to use strategies that reduce both the uncertainty and the 
burden of sheer calculation, 'budgeting is usually viewed as an incremental 
activity, grounded on a firm historical base’.  Because of, rather than in spite of, 
the complexity of the task, it is an activity that is invariably characterised by the 
use of the simplest rules of thumb. 
 
The largest factor determining the size and content of any single year's budget is 
usually the previous year's budget.  In fact, because of previous commitments and 
constraints, and of the impact of changing external conditions, there is often very 
little room for flexibility in budgeting.  This is not to deny that lobbying, exhortations 
and friendships have a role to play.  They do, but the debate is usually centred on 
the changes in the budget from one year to the next.  These may be small in total 
compared with the budget as a whole, but they represent the main areas that can 
 56 
 
be influenced.  In this way, despite losing the opportunity for an overall appraisal of 
activities in relation to wider objectives, the magnitude of the task is brought within 
reasonable bounds. 
 
An incremental approach reduces the burden of calculation and the breadth of 
debate, but these benefits are gained at the expense of focusing the remaining 
debate on the areas of particular uncertainty and controversy-changes.  Is an 
increase justified?  What of the overspending on last year's budget?  Does it 
represent inefficiency, non-recurring conditions or an inadequate budget?  Should 
this year's budget be lower, the same or higher?  Careful analysis can, of course, 
provide some assistance, and the analytical procedures at our disposal are being 
continually developed, but since the basic problem involves the extrapolation of an 
uncertain past into an uncertain future, analysis alone cannot solve the problem. 
 
In practice, senior management tackle the problem with the knowledge that difficult 
questions do not have to be solved once and for all on a year-to-year basis - the 
process is evolving.  The budgeting cycle rarely precludes further action during the 
year when more detailed knowledge may become available, and although 
precedents are important in this context, it is still possible to adopt an idea in 
another year that was not considered in a previous year.  Also, within the annual 
review, the process is usually organised so that experience and insights 
accumulate as the budget moves from department to department, and iterates 
between one level in the hierarchy and the next. 
 
There still remains a need to simplify radically the complexity so, at times, 
personalities rather than activities may be appraised.  Budgetary decisions can 
also be made within the context of a predetermined amount of resources that are 
to be allocated.  'How much can we afford?' then becomes more important than 
the objectives that can be attained, and organisational norms develop to guide the 
priority to be given to individual requests.  There are a multitude of other similar 
simplifying strategies, but in the end, if all else fails, the 'big axe' approach may be 
used and just arbitrarily, without logic, dictate a cut of X% across the board.  Such 
strategies are a response not only to the uncertainty and complexity that are 
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inherent in the budgetary process, but also to the fact that managers' budget 
demands reflect both organisational necessities and individual ambitions. 
 
Due to the increasing discussion of the ideals of incrementalism by those writers 
concerned not only with extending or validating the original ideas of Wildavsky 
(1978) and Lindblom, but also with challenging their prescriptive basis, Greenwood 
et al (1977) took the concept of incrementalism and applied it to the budgetary 
practices of English local government.  Their concern was to probe one of the 
assumptions which they believed to exist within the ideals of incrementalism, 
namely that of resource expansion or growth. 
 
They came to the conclusion that a contraction in the supply of resources widens 
the parameters of budgetary review and introduces a greater measure of 
rationality, and whilst accepting that most of the budget is left untouched each 
year, and that the dominant mode of analysis is political and non-rational, the 
extent to which the parameters of budgetary review are restricted, and the extent 
to which the mode of analysis is non-rational, are at least partly affected by what 
happens to the supply of resources.  Budgetary famine, at least for a time, 
decreases the likelihood of incremental budgeting, as authorities are forced to take 
a closer look at their 'inescapable commitments' and this involves a need to 
identify the additional expenditure built into the local authority's financial system 
over previous years. 
 
5.5 Concept of ‘Muddling Through’ 
 
Dror (1964), when examining Lindblom's concept, noted “unless three closely 
interrelated conditions are concurrently met, incremental change by ‘successive 
limited comparisons’ is not an adequate method for policy making”.  These three 
essential conditions are that: 
 
• the results of present policies must be in the main satisfactory (to the policy 
makers and the social strata on which they depend), so that marginal 
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changes are sufficient for meeting an acceptable rate of improvement in 
policy results; 
 
• there must be a high degree of continuity in the nature of the problems; 
and, 
 
• there must be a high degree of continuity in the available means for dealing 
with problems. 
 
When the results of past policies are undesirable, it is often preferable to take the 
risks involved in radical new departures.  When there are no past policies in 
respect to a discrete policy issue, incremental change is in fact impossible.  
Changes in knowledge - technological and behavioural - put at the disposal of 
policy makers new means of action that, unless ignored, lead to radically new 
policies. 
 
The three conditions essential to the validity of the 'muddling through' thesis are 
most likely to prevail where there is a high degree of social stability.  Under 
conditions of stability, routine is often the best policy and, with change being at a 
slow rate, incremental policy change is often optimal.  But, even in the most stable 
societies, many of today's qualitatively most important problems are tied up with 
high speed changes in levels of aspirations, the nature of issues, and the available 
means of action, and require therefore a policy making method different from 
'muddling through’. 
 
Taken together, the limited validity of the 'muddling through' thesis, and its inertia-
reinforcing implications, constitute a very serious weakness.  This criterion in no 
way diminishes Lindblom's pioneering role in pointing out the potential 
shortcomings of the 'rational-comprehensive' policy making model.  This may well 
prove to be one of his most important contributions, since the counter-model of 
'muddling through' is itself open to serious doubts. 
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To state the problem of policy making as a choice between the 'rational-
comprehensive' and the 'successive limited comparison' methods is misleading 
and dangerous: misleading because other policy making models may be devised, 
and dangerous because it leads to either an effort to achieve the impossible or an 
encouragement of inertia and a continuation of the status quo. 
 
The model presented in 'muddling through' can be considered inadequate, having 
limited validity, and constituting a barrier to the improvement of policy making.  Its 
favourable acceptance, the result in part of its many merits, reflects the 
widespread disposition of administrators and students of public administration to 
accept the present as a guide to the future, and to regard contemporary practice 
as a norm for the future. 
 
The broad acceptance of the 'muddling through' thesis indicates that inertia, and 
the tendency to 'incremental change', are in fact widespread phenomena.  This is 
commonly referred to as Bricolage, so named by Claudio Ciborra (1996). 
 
J. B. Quinn (1980a) found that when well-managed major organisations make 
significant changes in strategy, the approaches they use frequently bear little 
resemblance to the rational, analytical systems so often described in the planning 
literature. 
 
Although the formal planning approach is excellent for some purposes, it tends to 
focus unduly on measurable quantitative forces and to under-emphasise the vital 
qualitative, organisational and power-behavioural factors that so often determine 
strategic success in one situation versus another.  It can easily become a rigid, 
cumbersome routine, used primarily as a basis for financial control, rather than as 
a creative direction-setting challenge.  The processes used to arrive at the total 
strategy are typically fragmented, evolutionary and largely intuitive.  In well-run 
organisations, managers proactively guide these streams of actions and events 
incrementally toward conscious strategies rather than by the step-by-step formal 
systems planning approach so often espoused. 
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5.6 Concept of Logical Incrementalism 
 
Quinn (1980b) found that although the processes used at first appeared to be 
disjointed or ‘muddling', they actually embodied a strong internal logic that is 
consistent among companies and among action sequences within individual 
companies. 
 
Quinn's (1980c) studies showed that: 
 
• effective strategies tended to emerge from a series of strategic formulation 
subsystems.  Each subsystem involved a somewhat different set of players, 
information needs and time imperatives.  Each attacked a specific issue of 
corporate-wide importance in a disciplined way.  Yet for good reasons, 
optimal strategies within each subsystem tended to demand incrementalism 
and opportunism in their formulation; 
 
• the logic patterns underlying the formulation of effective strategies for each 
subsystem were so powerful that they could serve as normative 
approaches for creating these key components of strategy in large 
organisations.  Yet the timing imperatives and internal pacing parameters of 
each subsystem rarely matched the precise needs of other simultaneously 
active strategic subsystems; 
 
• because each subsystem had its own cognitive limits and process limits, its 
strategies tended to be arrived at logically and incrementally.  
Consequently, the total enterprises strategy - which had to deal with the 
interactions of all the subsystem strategies - was also arrived at by an 
approach most appropriately described as "logical incrementalism"; and, 
 
• in the hands of a skilful manager, such incrementalism was not muddling.  It 
was a purposeful, effective, proactive management technique for improving 
and integrating both the analytical and the behavioural aspects of strategy 
formulation. 
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When executives were asked to "describe the processes through which your 
company arrived at its new posture", several important points emerged (Quinn, 
1980d).  These were that: 
 
• few issues lent themselves to quantitative modelling techniques or perhaps 
even formal financial analyses; 
 
• successful companies used a different subsystem to formulate strategy for 
each major class of strategic issue despite the fact that these subsystems 
were quite similar among companies even in very different industries (see 
Figure 4 below); and, 
 
• no single formal analytical process could handle all these strategic variables 
simultaneously on a planned basis. 
 
Top executives often consciously tried to deal with precipitating events in an 
incremental fashion. To improve both the information content and the process 
aspects of decisions surrounding precipitating events, logic dictates, and practice 
affirms, that they are normally best handled carefully and consciously 
incrementally, to make decisions as late as possible consistent with the 
information available and needed.
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Capital 
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Annual Planning: 
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Encourages horizon-scanning studies 
Helps sum and balance commitments 
Teaches executives future impact of decisions 
Provides a vehicle for negotiating operating goals 
Co-ordinates tactical, divisional, corporate, strategic plans 
etc. 
Fig. 4    Strategies form in subsystems 
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One also finds that an incremental logic applies in attacking many other critical 
subsystems of corporate strategy.  Conscious incrementalism often helps in three 
important process dimensions: 
 
• coping with the varying lead times and sequencing arrangements 
demanded by interacting major decisions; 
 
• overcoming important political and informational barriers to needed 
changes; and, 
 
• creating the personal and organisational awareness, understanding, 
acceptance and commitment needed to implement strategies effectively. 
 
Managers cannot isolate each of these processes and deal with their imperatives 
separately and in a completely orderly fashion.  Instead, executives must move 
forward incrementally, integrating all three parameters each time a crucial step in 
any of the three processes allows. 
 
Quinn (1980e) concluded that 'the most effective strategies of major enterprises 
tend to emerge step by step from an iterative process in which the organisation 
probes the future, experiments and learns from a series of partial (incremental) 
commitments, rather than through global formulations of total strategies'.  Good 
managers use this process to improve the information available for decisions and 
to build the psychological identification essential to successful strategies.  The 
process is both logical and incremental.  Such logical incrementalism is not 
"muddling" as most people understand that word. 
 
Properly managed, it is a conscious, purposeful, proactive, executive practice. 
Logical incrementalism honours and utilises the global analyses inherent in formal 
strategy formulation models.  It also embraces the central tenets of the political or 
power-behavioural approaches to such decision making.  Each approach becomes 
simply a component in a logical process that improves the quality of available 
information, establishes critical elements of political power and credibility, creates 
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needed participation and psychological commitment, and thus enhances both the 
quality of strategic decisions and the likelihood of their successful implementation. 
  
Logic dictates that executives manage each subsystem incrementally in keeping 
with its own imperatives.  Effective strategic managers in large organisations 
recognise the subsystems' unpredictable interactions with each other and try to 
proactively shape the development of both subsystem and total enterprise 
strategies in a logically incremental fashion. 
 
5.7 Strategic planning 
 
Henry Mintzberg shared many of the views of Quinn, and was critical of the notion 
that planning systems could produce the best strategies as well as step-by-step 
instructions for carrying out those strategies so that the doers, the managers of 
businesses, could not get them wrong.  
 
In an article adapted from his book The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning 
(Mintzberg, 1994), he suggested that, while certainly not dead, strategic planning 
had long since fallen from its pedestal.  He suggested that few people fully 
understood the reason which, in his opinion, was that strategic planning is not 
strategic thinking.  Indeed, strategic planning often spoils strategic thinking, 
causing managers to confuse real vision with the manipulation of numbers.  And 
this confusion, he proposed, lies at the heart of the issue: the most successful 
strategies are visions, not plans.  The following fuller review of that article will help 
to understand, and appreciate, Mintzberg’s line of thought. 
 
Mintzberg suggested that strategic planning, as it had been practised, had really 
been strategic programming, the articulation and elaboration of strategies, or 
visions, that already existed.  Only when companies understood the difference 
between planning and strategic thinking, would they be able to get back to what 
the strategy-making process should be: capturing what the manager learns from 
all sources (both the soft insights from his or her personal experiences and the 
experiences of others throughout the organisation, and the hard data from market 
research and the like), and then synthesising that learning into a vision of the 
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direction that the business should pursue. 
 
Mintzberg’s view was that planners should supply the formal analyses or hard data 
that strategic thinking requires, as long as they did it to broaden the consideration 
of issues rather than to discover the one right answer.  They should act as 
catalysts who support strategy making by aiding and encouraging managers to 
think strategically.  And, finally, they should be programmers of a strategy, helping 
to specify the series of concrete steps needed to carry out the vision. 
 
Mintzberg suggested that strategic thinking was all about synthesis, involving both 
intuition and creativity.  The outcome of strategic thinking is an integrated 
perspective of the enterprise, a not-too-precisely articulated vision of direction, 
such as the vision of Jim Clark, the founder of Silicon Graphics, that three-
dimensional visual computing is the way to make computers easier to use.  
Mintzberg’s view brought him into direct conflict with the views of Michael Porter 
who, in an article published in 1987 (Porter, 1987), expressed the opinion that 
“strategic thinking rarely occurs spontaneously.  Without guidelines few managers 
knew what constituted strategic thinking”. 
 
Mintzberg’s view was that planning represented a calculating style of 
management, not a committing style.  Managers with a committing style engage 
people in a journey.  They lead in such a way that everyone on the journey helps 
shape its course.  As a result, enthusiasm inevitably builds along the way.  Those 
with a calculating style fix on a destination and calculate what the group must do to 
get there, with no concern for the members’ preferences.  But calculated strategies 
have no value in and of themselves; to paraphrase the words of sociologist Philip 
Selznick, strategies take on value only as committed people infuse them with 
energy (Selznick, 1957). 
 
At lower levels in the hierarchy, the problem becomes more severe because 
planning has often been used to exercise blatant control over business managers. 
No wonder so many middle managers have welcomed the overthrow of strategic 
planning.  All they wanted was a commitment to their own business strategies 
without having to fight the planners to get it. 
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An expert has been defined as someone who avoids the many pitfalls on his or her 
way to the grand fallacy.  For strategic planning, Mintzberg suggested, the grand 
fallacy is this: because analysis encompasses synthesis, strategic planning is 
strategy making. 
 
This fallacy itself rests on three fallacious assumptions: 
 
• that prediction is possible, that strategists can be detached from the 
subjects of their strategies, and, above all, that the strategy-making process 
can be formalised.  According to the premises of strategic planning, the 
world is supposed to hold still while a plan is being developed and then stay 
on the predicted course while that plan is being implemented; 
 
• that if the system does the thinking, then strategies must be detached from 
operations (or “tactics”), formulation from implementation, thinkers from 
doers, and so strategists from the objects of their strategies.  In her book 
Institutionalising Innovation, Mariann Jelinek developed the interesting point 
that strategic planning is to the executive suite what Taylor’s work-study 
methods were to the factory floor; a way to circumvent human 
idiosyncrasies in order to systematise behaviour (Jelinek, 1979).  Ironically, 
strategic planning missed one of Taylor’s most important messages: work 
processes must be fully understood before they can be formally 
programmed; and, 
 
• that systems do better than, or even nearly as well as, human beings.  
Formal systems, mechanical or otherwise, have offered no improved means 
of dealing with the information overload of human brains; indeed, they have 
often made matters worse.  All the promises about artificial intelligence, 
expert systems, and the like improving if not replacing human intuition 
never materialised at the strategy level.  Formal systems could certainly 
process more information, at least hard information.  But they could never 
internalise it, comprehend it, and synthesise it.  In a literal sense, planning 
could not learn. 
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Formalisation implies a rational sequence, from analysis through administrative 
procedure to eventual action.  But strategy making as learning can proceed in the 
other direction too.  We think in order to act, to be sure, but we also act in order to 
think.  We try things, and those experiments that work converge gradually into 
viable patterns that become strategies.  This is the very essence of strategy 
making as a learning process. 
 
Whether formal procedures will ever be able to forecast discontinuities, inform 
detached managers, or create novel strategies, is a very interesting scenario.  Far 
from providing strategies, planning could not proceed without their prior existence.  
In light of this, Mintzberg suggested, strategic planning has been misnamed.  He 
asserted that it should have been called strategic programming, distinguished from 
other useful things that planners can do, and promoted as a process to formalise, 
when necessary, the consequences of strategies that have already been 
developed.  In short, the label ‘strategic planning’ should be dropped altogether. 
 
Mintzberg asserted that two important messages have been conveyed through all 
the difficulties encountered by strategic planning.  But only one of them has been 
widely accepted in the planning community: business-unit managers must take full 
and effective charge of the strategy-making process.  The lesson that has still not 
been accepted is that managers will never be able to take charge through a 
formalised process.  Planners, on the other hand, have the time and, most 
important, the inclination to analyse.  They have critical roles to play alongside line 
managers, but not as conventionally conceived.  They should work in the spirit of 
what Mintzberg called a ‘soft analyst’ whose intent is to pose the right questions 
rather than to find the right answers.  That way, complex issues get opened up to 
thoughtful consideration instead of being closed down prematurely by snap 
decisions. 
 
Mintzberg stressed one point that must be emphasised, this being that strategic 
programming is not “the one best way” or even necessarily “a good way”.  
Managers do not always need to program their strategies formally.  Sometimes 
they must leave their strategies flexible, as broad visions, to adapt to a changing 
environment.  Only when an organisation is sure of the relative stability of its 
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environment, and is in need of the tight co-ordination of a myriad of intricate 
operations, does such strategic programming make sense. 
 
Mintzberg also suggested that plans could be used to gain the tangible as well as 
moral support of influential outsiders.  Written plans inform financiers, suppliers, 
government agencies, and others about the intentions of the organisation so that 
these groups can help it achieve its plans.  Some of the best models that planners 
can offer managers are simply alternative conceptual interpretations of their world.  
As Arie de Geus, the one-time head of planning at Royal Dutch/Shell, wrote in an 
article (de Geus, 1988), “The real purpose of effective planning is not to make 
plans but to change the….mental models that….decision makers carry in their 
heads”. 
 
Mintzberg went on in his article to suggest that it was not planning that planners 
should be urging on their organisations, so much as any form of behaviour that 
could lead to effective performance in a given situation.  Sometimes that may even 
mean criticising formal planning itself.  When they act as catalysts, planners do not 
enter the black box of strategy making; they ensure that the box is occupied with 
active line managers.  In other words, they encourage managers to think about the 
future in creative ways. 
 
Mintzberg concluded his article by suggesting that human beings seem 
predisposed to formalise their behaviour.  But they must be careful not to go over 
the formalisation edge.  No doubt we must formalise to do many of the things we 
wish to in modern society.  That is why we have organisations.  But the 
experiences of what has been labelled strategic planning teach us that there are 
limits.  These limits must be understood, especially for complex and creative 
activities like strategy making.  Three decades of experience with strategic 
planning have taught us about the need to loosen up the process of strategy 
making rather than trying to seal it off by arbitrary formalisation.  Through all the 
false starts and excessive rhetoric, we have learned what planning is not and what 
it cannot do.  But we have also learned what planning is and what it can do, and 
perhaps of greater use, what planners themselves can do beyond planning.  We 
have also learned how the literature of management can get carried away and, 
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more important, about the appropriate place for analysis in organisations. 
 
The story of strategic planning, in other words, has taught us not only about formal 
technique itself but also about how organisations function and how managers do 
and do not cope with that functioning.  Most significant, it has told us something 
about how we think as human beings, and that we sometimes stop thinking. 
 
Having looked at two theories of decision making, the next chapter will explore the 
way in which the National Health Service has reviewed since 1974, particularly in 
the 1970s and 1980s, its approach to financial management in the context of the 
application of these two theories. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
  
This chapter reviews the way in which the National Health Service has sought to 
approach financial management since 1974, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, 
in terms of a consideration of the two approaches reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5, 
and the reasons behind the decision to continue with an incrementalist approach 
to financial management. 
 
The National Health Service has undergone several changes since its inception, 
but they have all had one aim in mind, namely that of Aneurin Bevan (1945) who 
said 'We have got to achieve as nearly as possible a uniform standard of service 
for all'.  By way of illustration, the 1974 structure change created area health 
authorities to replace the existing hospital management committees.  In the main 
the area health authorities were larger than the hospital management committees 
and it was necessary to create smaller district health authorities in order to achieve 
a unit of manageable size.  The idea of the area health authorities was that, where 
possible, they should be coterminous with the local authority boundaries in order 
to achieve collaboration over common services, such as mentally handicapped 
services, whereby joint planning would eliminate overlaps of provision. 
 
Before 1974, consultants and matrons had been in a position to influence 
decisions on the allocation of resources within hospital management committees, 
particularly those employed in 'acute' hospitals.  The introduction of area health 
authorities diminished this influence in that the point of decision making became 
more remote from the hospitals, enabling those in long stay hospitals to have a 
greater chance of securing a fair proportion of resources.  Because the area health 
authorities provided community services as well as hospital services, deficiencies 
in one service could be identified more easily than had been the case. 
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6.2 Background to the National Health Service Planning System 
 
The introduction of the National Health Service Planning System further provided a 
means of identification of deficiency in services in that it introduced a national 
policy that embraced a multitude of factors in determining the development of 
health care.  One part of this national policy was the appointment of the Resource 
Allocation Working Party which was set up to review the arrangements for 
distributing capital and revenue to health authorities, with a view to establishing a 
method of securing a pattern of distribution which would be responsive to relative 
need, such method to be objective, equitable and efficient.  It must be noted that 
the Working Party was not asked to concern itself with the adequacy of resources, 
only on the allocation of the resources that were actually available. 
 
The Report (DHSS, 1976) subsequently published is outside the scope of this 
dissertation; suffice it to say that it recommended five main criteria to indicate 
relative need: 
 
• the size of population - clearly this must be the primary factor in establishing 
relative need for resources; 
 
• the population structure - generally elderly people need more care than the 
young, women have different needs from men, etc.; 
 
• morbidity - the greater the level of sickness in an area the greater the 
relative need for resources; 
 
• relative cost - statistical evidence suggests that the cost of providing health 
services varies considerably according to the condition being treated; and, 
 
• the cross boundary flow of patients - these flows are obviously important in 
determining the relative need for resources, and account must be taken of 
them. 
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The factors were combined to build up an overall measure of relative need for 
each regional health authority by breaking down the health services provided into 
seven different aspects and to treat each of these in a different way. 
 
The result was that the four Thames Regional Health Authorities plus the Oxford 
Regional Health Authority were receiving more resources than their calculated 
target and would be expected to lose resources in favour of the under-resourced 
regions over a period of years. 
 
The recommendations of the Resource Allocation Working Party provided the 
mechanism for inter-regional resource allocation in the National Health Service. 
The general reduction of growth in National Health Service resources, largely 
arising from successive policies of reduced public spending caused by the 
changing financial and economic scene of the early 1970s, meant that the rate at 
which the demands could be met was also reduced accordingly.  Lack of revenue 
growth meant that the equalisation of services could not be achieved. 
 
All these events led to pressure for the 1974 structure to be modified and the 
report of the Royal Commission on the National Health Service in 1979 supported 
this.  The Government's response, 'Patients First', proposed urgent changes both 
in the structure and management of the National Health Service. 
 
This was achieved in 1982 when multi-district area health authorities were 
replaced with single-district health authorities.  This structure was a product of the 
belief that decisions should be made by those close to the local community and 
the patients. One effect worth mentioning here is that this negated, to some extent, 
the joint planning arrangements in that many local councils now had to deal with 
several district health authorities instead of one single area health authority. 
 
Some of the district health authorities created by the 1982 re-organisation were 
very small, and the task of the regional health authorities in distributing funds on 
the Resource Allocation Working Party basis led to a mechanistic outlook on 
resource allocation owing to the much larger number of health authorities with 
whom they had to deal. 
  
73 
 
Another change was the proposal that delegation of routine decisions be made to 
the unit level, to be matched by a strengthening of management at the unit level by 
the introduction of a unit management team. 
 
The 1982 structure did not seem to have an answer to the problem of financial 
stringency.  If resources grow in limited degrees, or even contract, it is very difficult 
to achieve an equalisation of services without a severe contraction in the provision 
of acute and general services. 
 
Guidance on the implementation of the 1982 changes was issued in Health 
Circular (80)8 'Health Service Development Structure and Management'.  This 
dealt with organisational and financial implications, including such things as local 
arrangements for services which might cover the area of more than one district 
health authority, for example, ambulance services and family practitioner 
committee services. 
 
The concept of consensus management was still preferred through the 
establishment of district management teams, the precise composition and function 
being the same as that of the former area management team.  The Royal 
Commission on the National Health Service pointed to the risk that 'consensus 
management may sap individual responsibility by allowing it to be shared', and the 
Circular stated expressly that 'both authorities and team members must ensure 
that the personal responsibilities of individual managers are not blurred or qualified 
by their responsibilities as members of the management team'. 
 
6.3 Principles of the National Health Service Planning System 
 
'Patients First' included several proposals for change, one of the four main 
elements being the 'Simplification of the planning system in a way which will 
ensure that regional plans are fully sensitive to district needs'.  The result of this 
was Health Circular (82)6 'The National Health Service Planning System'.  The 
purpose of the planning system was to provide a framework within which health 
authorities could review and develop their services in the light of national policies 
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and priorities, assist Ministers in assessing progress towards national goals and in 
reviewing those goals, and help to achieve the best use of resources. 
 
The system consisted of three elements, each being seen as important to the 
successful operation of the system.  These were: 
 
• the strategic plan – a comprehensive review of all services every five years 
having regard to the prevailing national policies and priorities, as well as to 
areas of local priority.  A concise statement is prepared setting out the 
present conditions, perceived needs, policies and goals for the future in the 
form of a strategic plan, covering a forward period of ten years.  Strategic 
planning will always be accompanied by uncertainty and plans must be 
constructed to take account of this. District health authorities would prepare 
strategic plans in the light of an outline regional strategy, reflecting national 
policies and priorities, resource availability and regional circumstances.  
District strategic plans would be submitted to the regional health authority, 
which in turn prepared a regional strategic plan for submission to the 
Department of Health and Social Security (the Department).  The strategic 
plan would need to be kept under review and modified as circumstances 
changed; 
 
• the annual plan - every year each district health authority would prepare 
and publish a programme setting out the action proposed for the two 
following financial years to carry forward the district strategy.  The 
programme for the next financial year (the operational programme) would 
represent the authority's firm development proposals on the "latest available 
resource assumptions”.  The programme for the second financial year (the 
forward programme) would embody provisional proposals and would 
ultimately become the operational programme for the following year; and, 
 
• the annual planning review - there would be annual planning review 
meetings between the Department and regional health authorities and 
between regional health authorities and district health authorities. 
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It can be inferred from the above that the revised system represented planning as 
a 'learning process' in that plans, both strategic and annual, would be prepared in 
the light of known and foreseeable factors, but that they would have to be modified 
and up-dated in the light of new factors and changes. 
  
The old hospital plan and associated managerial reforms laid the emphasis on 
more rational decision making for its own intrinsic value and possibly for better 
cost control.  The objectives for a better balance of health care and redistribution 
of resources led to the means - a more rational and efficient managerial structure 
and decision making system - to get firmer ends. 
 
The new planning system can be seen to have been designed to improve the 
quality of managerial decision making by requiring health authority personnel to 
follow particular analytical processes in the preparation of plans.  The model to be 
used as a sequence of thought in the new planning system came within the 
definition of rational decision making in that it started with the identification of 
objectives (needs) and ended with their implementation and subsequent review.   
 
However, the new planning system remained primarily concerned with inputs 
rather than the quality of services (outputs) and their impact on health (outcomes).  
The new system was intended to enhance the importance attached to decision 
making, based first on the identification of ends (that is, needs, objectives or aims), 
second on the choice of the most appropriate means, and subsequently on the 
monitoring and review of progress towards those ends. 
 
6.4 Limitations of the National Health Service Planning System 
 
It is important to note, however, that the Royal Commission advocated an 
incremental change strategy.  This was considered desirable owing to a number of 
factors.  These were that: 
 
• the best use of the resources of the National Health Service requires that its 
decision makers be provided promptly with relevant information on needs 
and on the volume and cost of resources used in meeting those needs.  
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Unfortunately the information available to assist decision makers in the 
National Health Service left much to be desired.  Relevant information was 
not available at all, or in the wrong form.  Information that was produced 
was often too late to assist decisions and was often of dubious accuracy; 
 
• without explicit measures of the need of groups of patients for health care, 
rational decisions on priorities and geographical distribution of resources 
was impossible.  The lack of outcome measures meant that judgements of 
the efficiency of service delivery rested on insecure foundations; 
 
• if an organisation cannot keep track of its resources it is unlikely to be using 
them effectively, and decisions on how those resources ought to be 
developed are made much more difficult; and, 
 
• sensible decisions at all levels in the service required information on the 
costs of resources used in providing services to patients, but the existing 
system of annual financial accounts (and linked functional 'cost accounts') 
did not appear to provide significantly valuable information for improved 
resource allocation or other decision making.  Cost data necessary for 
planning, decision making and resource allocation was, therefore, difficult to 
derive. 
 
The Department of Health and Social Security was obviously aware of the 
criticisms (or limitations) when they drafted and issued the National Health Service 
Planning System, which relied heavily on rational decision making in the planning 
and budgeting processes. 
 
6.5 Review of the National Health Service Planning System 
 
Those responsible for the system must have had the limitations in mind, and it 
must be assumed that they felt such a system to be the most desirable.  We must 
look, therefore, to the subsequent period to see whether any of the limitations 
were to be examined with a view to improving them to the extent to which they 
could become useful and relevant to the rational decision making process. 
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Perhaps the three most important areas of investigation that were reviewed were 
those of speciality costing, clinical involvement and the redesigning of the 
Standard Accounting System. 
 
6.5.1 Speciality Costing 
 
The first was speciality costing.  This area of speciality costing work, known as the 
Magee System (Magee and Osmolski, 1979), was developed at Bridgend Hospital.  
This system was replicated in seven trial centres throughout Britain to establish 
differences that occur at various types of hospitals.  Basically, the system 
aggregated hospital expenditure to speciality groups.  It achieved this by the direct 
allocation, where possible, of items of expenditure to discrete specialities, and 
then by apportioning expenditure between different specialities of departments 
where they could not be deemed to be exclusive.  The Magee System was a low 
cost system that had the merit of needing very little clerical and accounting support 
to implement it.  It provided an interesting development in making people at least 
more aware of the need to understand speciality costs.  This in turn enabled 
questions to be asked about how resources were used, and enabled comparisons 
between specialities to be made.  One particular disadvantage of it, however, was 
where one had to apportion expenditure that could not easily be identified across a 
number of different specialities. 
 
This approach is not surprising since speciality costing is a form of activity based 
costing.  Activity based costing offers an alternative to traditional accounting in that 
it can be used to identify, describe, assign costs to, and report on particular 
activities.  It is intended to offer a more accurate cost management system than 
traditional cost accounting by identifying opportunities to improve business 
process effectiveness and efficiency by determining the true cost of a product or 
service.  Activity based costing is used to focus management attention on the total 
cost to produce a product or service, and as the basis for full cost recovery.  The 
most suitable areas to which activity based costing is relevant are those for which 
identifiable and measurable units of output can be determined (Cooper, 1988a; 
1988b; 1989a; 1989b; 1990; Johnson, 1990). 
 
  
78 
 
The underlying attraction of an activity based costing approach for the National 
Health Service was that it was perceived to be a management tool that could be 
used to provide a better allocation of resources.  It offered a cost accounting 
methodology that could be used to define processes, identify the cost drivers of 
those processes, and determine the unit costs of products and services.  A major 
advantage of using activity based costing was that it sought to avoid or minimise 
distortions in costing that could result from arbitrary allocations of indirect costs.   
 
Unlike more traditional budgets which could not be tied to specific outputs, the use 
of activity based costing techniques was considered capable of generating useful 
information on how money was spent, whether an activity was cost-effective, and 
how to benchmark for quality improvement.  
 
The rationale for using such a technique is that it is possible to make clear 
connections between costs and outputs, thereby creating a more accurate and 
useful financial picture.  Costs that are visible and explicit are essential to the 
effective allocation of resources, and activity based costing takes into account all 
of the costs involved in producing and delivering a service.  The implementation of 
activity based costing involves four steps: 
 
• identify activities - an in-depth analysis of the operating processes of each 
activity is undertaken; 
 
• assign resource costs to activities - this involves the identification of direct 
costs, those costs that can be attributed directly to the activity,  indirect 
costs, those costs that cannot be allocated to a specific activity but have to 
be apportioned across a number of activities, and general and 
administrative costs, those costs that cannot be related to any activity but 
would remain the same irrespective of the activity undertaken; 
 
• identify outputs – identify all of the outputs for which an activity consumes 
resources; and, 
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• assign activity costs to outputs – use activity drivers to assign activity costs 
to outputs based on demand for the activity.  Activity drivers could be 
transaction drivers linked to the number of times an activity is performed, or 
duration drivers linked to the length of time that an activity is performed. 
 
The adoption of such an approach is intended to encourage managers to identify 
those activities that are likely to deliver a service best, or meet a customer demand 
by improving operational efficiency and enhancing decision-making through better, 
more meaningful cost information (Cooper and Kaplan, 1988). 
 
It can be seen that an activity based costing approach relies heavily on the 
availability of robust data and information, something that was sadly lacking in the 
National Health Service in the 1970s and 1980s, and which remains the case 
today (Audit Commission, 2004a). 
 
6.5.2 Clinical involvement 
 
The second was clinical involvement.  The clinical decisions that doctors make 
heavily influence National Health Service expenditure and whilst doctors have 
clinical responsibility, they are not usually accountable for the resource and 
financial implications of their decisions.  No doubt many doctors are cost-
conscious and careful, but the individual doctor normally has no direct incentive to 
economise.  In view of this, the Clinical Accountability Service Planning and 
Evaluation (CASPE) research developed.  The intention was to agree with 
clinicians the level of activity, and therefore the level of resources, for them to 
carry out an agreed and planned workload.  By feeding back activity and cost 
information to clinical teams on a regular basis, and comparing this with the 
agreement first decided upon, it would be possible to see what had changed and 
to ask why it should be so. 
 
An added benefit was that better information would be available to view increases 
or decreases in the provision of various services.  Unlike the Magee System, this 
system really did involve the clinical staff in looking at the use of resources.  It was 
an information-providing system and relied upon the commitment and enthusiasm 
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of all clinicians to make it work.  One thing it did was to bring into the open the 
need to have a better understanding of how clinicians use resources and how 
changes in patient care can affect supporting departments. 
 
6.5.3 Standard Accounting System 
 
The third was a Standard Accounting System.  The then Standard Accounting 
System enabled managers, with firmer budgetary control than in the past, to make 
decisions about spending based on full information regarding the present state of 
their budget. Basically, its special features centred around the philosophy that 
LOCAL management could decide just what information it wanted, and its features 
can be illustrated as follows.  Financial information could be provided to all levels 
of National Health Service management, the information was in the form of 
narrative reports, printed directly by the computer, both routine management 
reports and a large variety of special ad hoc reports could be provided, the form 
and content of each report could be designed locally, budgets, workload and 
performance data could be included on reports, and budgets were phased and 
updated by facilities under local control. 
 
The flexibility of the system was such that almost any report could be specified 
locally, input to the system without the involvement of programmers, and produced 
directly from the computer on a regular or ad hoc basis.  For example, 
management accounts could be produced on a Functional Basis (to accord with 
the format laid down in the National Health Service Accounting Manual) (Appendix 
A), on a Personally Designed Basis (Appendix B) and/or an Exception Basis 
(Appendix C), that is, to report only variations which deviate from the budget by 
more than a locally specified percentage. 
 
The potential benefits identified were that the budgetary information and 
associated statistics would be capable of being provided to each functional budget 
holder in exactly the way they desired, both in numerical and narrative form, as 
frequently as required, thus facilitating effective functional budgetary control, 
promoting cost-consciousness and achieving value for money. 
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Following the reorganisation, it became clear that the new 'Patients First' 
philosophy needed on-line integrated management information.  The system was 
redesigned to meet the present and future demands of its users, and was called 
the Interactive Resource Information System (IRIS). 
 
Consultation established that users wanted a system that retained the best 
features of the Standard Accounting System but that was substantially upgraded 
to provide a full on-line service, that was under the user's control and could be 
tailored to suit their needs and therefore must be versatile, that was competitive in 
price, and that took advantage of new technology. 
 
Whilst all these attributes were important, the system's contribution to financial 
restraint would be judged on its ability to produce information that was accurate, 
relevant and timely for each and every level of management involved in ensuring 
effective budgetary control.  It was also required to do this at a cost acceptable to 
the user. 
 
The object of IRIS was that it would provide a database allowing districts to draw 
what information they require into patient, clinical and costing systems that have 
been designed locally.  This was intended to at least enable health authorities 
more accurately to identify in advance the consequences of planned financial 
restraint rather than having to continue managing on a stop/go basis. 
 
6.6 Outcome of the review of the National Health Service Planning System 
 
In practice, it proved difficult to implement for a number of reasons: 
 
• because it is difficult to quantify and value the benefits arising from 
organisational activities; 
 
• because some services must be provided by statute, even though they may 
have a low priority, for example, the monitoring of private nursing homes is 
not a priority but the service must be provided; 
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• because it is not easy to discontinue certain activities, for example, 
manpower cannot be easily disposed of or redeployed; and, 
 
• because zero-based budgeting techniques are time-consuming, 
bureaucratic and expensive to operate. 
 
For these reasons, authorities kept to the incremental approach whereby budget 
preparation starts with the previous year's budget.  Changes will be made but, by 
and large, these will only be at the margin.  Any incremental activities might be 
reflected by an increased budget and vice-versa for reduced activities.  The bulk of 
the budget is left unchallenged in that budget holders are not asked to justify each 
year the reasons for carrying out the various departmental activities, and thus 
incurring expenditure.  Any inefficiencies or mis-use of resources is perpetuated, 
but because of the problems of zero-based budgeting, this is the form currently 
used, to a large extent, in the National Health Service. 
 
The National Health Service Planning System and authorities' budget preparations 
were obviously not readily compatible in achieving the required outcome, because 
better service information was required, and until that information was available, it 
was inevitable that rational decision making could not properly and fully be 
implemented, however desirable it may have seemed. 
 
Tom Evans, the Director of King's Fund, an independent charitable foundation 
working for better health, especially in London, and which carries out research, 
policy analysis and development activities, working on its own, in partnerships, 
and through funding, highlighted the need for systematic comparisons between 
what should happen and what actually happened, and he compared the 
management of the National Health Service with 'steering the boat by looking over 
the stern and watching the wake'. 
 
6.7 Subsequent developments 
 
The National Health Service experienced the most significant cultural shift since its 
inception with the introduction of the so-called internal market, outlined in the 1989 
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White Paper, Working for Patients, and which passed into law as the NHS and 
Community Care Act 1990.  The internal market was the Conservative 
Government's attempt to address problems, such as growing waiting lists, which 
had arisen in the 1980s as a result of National Health Service resources being 
constrained while demand rose inexorably.  
 
Before the 1990 Act a monolithic bureaucracy ran all aspects of the National 
Health Service.  After the establishment of the internal market, 'purchasers' (health 
authorities and some family doctors) were given budgets to buy health care from 
'providers' (acute hospitals, organisations providing care for the mentally ill, people 
with learning disabilities and the elderly, and ambulance services). 
 
To become a 'provider' in the internal market, health organisations became 
National Health Service Trusts, independent organisations with their own 
managements, competing with each other.  The first wave of 57 National Health 
Service Trusts came into being in 1991.  By 1995, all health care was provided by 
National Health Service Trusts.  Over the same period, many family doctors were 
also given their own budgets with which to buy health care from National Health 
Service Trusts in a scheme called GP fund holding.  Not all GPs joined this 
scheme and their budgets were still controlled by health authorities, which bought 
health care 'in bulk' from National Health Service Trusts. 
 
Patients of GP fund holders were often able to obtain treatment more quickly than 
patients of non-fund holders.  This led to accusations of the National Health 
Service operating a two tier system, contrary to the founding principles of the 
National Health Service of fair and equal access for all to health care. 
 
Observers credit the internal market with improving cost consciousness in the 
National Health Service, but at a price: that the competition it encouraged between 
'providers' saw unnecessary duplication of services. 
 
The election of a new Government in May 1997 brought a new approach to the 
National Health Service.  Pledging itself to abolition of the internal market, the new 
Government set out an approach which aimed to build on what had worked 
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previously, but discarding what had failed.  A new white paper issued by the 
Department of Health, The New NHS. Modern. Dependable., put forward a “third 
way” of running the service - based on partnership and driven by performance.  
The paper set out an approach which promised to “go with the grain” of efforts by 
National Health Service staff to overcome obstacles within the internal market, 
building on the moves which had already taken place in the National Health 
Service to move away from outright competition to a more collaborative approach.  
 
The white paper described this approach as "a new model for a new century", 
based on six key principles: 
 
• to renew the National Health Service as a genuinely national service, 
offering fair access to consistently high quality, prompt and accessible 
services right across the country; 
 
• to make the delivery of healthcare against these new national standards a 
matter of local responsibility, with local doctors and nurses in the driving 
seat in shaping services; 
 
• to get the National Health Service to work in partnership, breaking down 
organisational barriers and forging stronger links with local authorities; 
 
• to drive efficiency through a more rigorous approach to performance, 
cutting bureaucracy to maximise every pound spent in the National Health 
Service for the care of patients; 
 
• to shift the focus onto quality of care so that excellence would be 
guaranteed to all patients, with quality the driving force for decision making 
at every level of the service; and, 
 
• to rebuild public confidence in the National Health Service as a public 
service, accountable to patients, open to the public and shaped by their 
views.  
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As the National Health Service entered its 50th year, a new era had begun, and a 
new information strategy to support the process was proposed.  The details were 
set out in an NHS Executive Circular HSC 1998/168 Information for Health: An 
Information Strategy for the Modern NHS.  I would draw attention to one of the 
outcomes that the strategy was envisaged to deliver, and which had been 
highlighted as a deficiency in the attempt to introduce, in the 1980s, the 
rationalism approach, namely ‘more effective use of NHS resources by providing 
NHS planners and managers with the information they need’ (HSC, 1998a). 
 
The Circular also made reference to the fact that the proposals marked a 
significant shift from the previous emphasis on management information, focusing 
on the need for information to support the core purpose of the National Health 
Service without undermining the need for effective management of National Health 
Service resources (HSC, 1998b). 
 
Certainly, maximising the huge potential of IT was, and is, central to bringing to life 
the vision of a modern National Health Service.  But it was only with the 
publication of the 10-year NHS Plan in July 2000 (NHS, 2000) that sweeping plans 
to transform the National Health Service into a health service fit for the 21st 
century came into focus.  The NHS Plan promised: 
 
• more hospitals and beds; 
 
• more doctors and nurses; 
 
• much shorter waiting times for hospital and GP appointments; 
 
• cleaner wards, better food and facilities in hospitals; 
 
• improved care for older people; and, 
 
• tougher standards for National Health Service organisations and better 
rewards for the best. 
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But alongside this, the NHS Plan also promised greater power and more 
information for patients and the public.  A lot has happened since the NHS Plan 
was first published, but every development and initiative coming after has its roots 
in the NHS Plan's core vision of creating a “patient-led health service”.  The vision 
was that, for the first time, services would be built on the needs and preferences of 
patients rather than dictated by the old barriers between professions and different 
parts of the system.  This meant linking up all the services and care a patient 
needs to get better and stay well, and, wherever possible, offer these in 
convenient community settings closer to home.  
 
This latest chapter in the history of the National Health Service is still unfolding, 
but already there are some important milestones which illustrate the scope and the 
speed of the drive towards patient-centred services: 
 
• March 1998 - NHS Direct, the nurse-led health advice service, was 
launched to give people 24-hour health advice they could trust over the 
phone; 
 
• April 2001 - the creation in 2002 of locally-based Primary Care Trusts - 
organisations which control 80% of the National Health Service budget and 
have the role of running the local National Health Service and improving the 
health of people in their areas.  At the same time, 28 new Strategic Health 
Authorities replaced the former Health Authorities and took on a strategic 
role in improving local health services, while also making sure local National 
Health Service organisations performed well; 
 
• April 2002 – hospital payment system to move to one based on payment by 
results using a standard national price tariff and regional tariff system (NHS, 
2002a); 
 
• October 2003 - consultants in England voted in favour of a new contract 
aimed at rewarding them more fairly so that more National Health Service 
patients benefited from their skills, while also encouraging them to embrace 
new ways of working in, for instance, multi-disciplinary teams; 
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• April 2004 - new contracts were introduced also for GPs and local family 
practices, accompanied by new, extra funding for local health services.  The 
new contracts meant, for the first time, all practices were to be significantly 
rewarded for the quality of care they gave, and not just the numbers of 
patients they treated; 
 
• August 2004 - early Patient Choice pilots were extended giving all patients 
waiting longer than six months for their operation a choice of an alternative 
place for treatment. This was called 'choice at six months'.  By the end of 
2005, everyone referred by their doctor for hospital treatment would be 
offered a choice of at least four hospitals and be able to choose a time that 
was convenient to them; and, 
 
• December 2004 - the new Agenda for Change pay system began national 
roll-out.  Designed for nurses, ambulance staff and all other directly 
employed National Health Service staff (except doctors, dentists and some 
senior managers) the new system was meant to ensure fair pay and a 
clearer system for career progression.  For the first time staff would be paid 
on the basis of the jobs they were doing and the skills and knowledge they 
applied to these jobs. 
 
6.8 Review of subsequent developments 
 
The post 1980s developments were based on a fixation with target setting and, in 
keeping with the principles associated with the rationalism approach that was 
implicit in the developments, there was a requirement for an immense amount of 
information and data, not to mention the problems that arose in getting staff within 
the National Health Service, particularly the senior medical staff who are at the 
front line in the decision making process, to accept the consequences that would 
arise from such an approach. 
 
This is probably best illustrated in a British Medical Association briefing in April 
2003 (BMA, 2003) in which the British Medical Association complained that the 
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target and performance management culture of the National Health Service had 
resulted in around 250 targets for acute trusts and over 400 for primary care trusts. 
 
The NHS Confederation, an organisation that brings together the full range of 
organisations that make up the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, 
regarded this as “a remarkable confession about the department’s (Department of 
Health) assessment of its own approach” (NHS Confederation, 2003), since it 
appeared to be completely at variance with the Department of Health’s own press 
release for the launch of Foundation Hospitals which promised that “the best 
hospitals will be freed from excessive Whitehall control” (DoH, 2002). 
 
Pressure to meet targets can also result in unintended consequences and 
dysfunctional behaviours, such as deliberate manipulation of data, including 
‘creative’ accounting, and ‘gaming’, that is, altering behaviour so as to obtain 
strategic advantage (Goddard et al, 1998).  Indeed, the National Audit Office 
published in 2001 (NAO, 2001) a report on ‘inappropriate adjustments to waiting 
lists’, one of the findings being that patients were being offered admission during 
known holiday dates. 
 
The British Medical Association also suggested in the briefing in April 2003 that 
the barrage of targets needed to be reduced to a smaller number of measures of 
structure and process that had been demonstrated to be linked to outcomes, and 
that this should be combined with a culture that trusts health care professionals to 
find innovative solutions to local problems.  The need for accountability could be 
addressed through the use of external audit bodies that could provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the performance of the local health system and, 
importantly, have been shown to produce improvements in quality (Klein and Day, 
2001). 
 
6.9 Planning and Priorities 
 
All of the above, however, was concerned with planning and it is here that the 
basic problems arose.  The terms 'planning' and 'priorities' are often used 
synonymously but they do in fact represent different concepts.  Generally the 
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determination of priorities for the National Health Service falls to the Secretary of 
State as the policy maker, while planning is the province of the health authorities.  
Planning is the means by which the Secretary of State's priorities can be 
translated into strategies. 
 
To a large extent priorities can be formulated on the basis of information currently 
available but ultimately, however, the National Health Service is restricted by the 
resources available to it, and consequently choices have to be made. 
  
It is desirable that there should be some acceptable method for choosing between 
alternative priorities, and the question is frequently asked: How does the Secretary 
of State select those priorities to be promulgated within the National Health 
Service?  Economists, for example, suggest a similar approach to cost/benefit 
analysis.  For each option, the costs and benefits of implementation should be 
assessed and options ranked in order of greatest net benefit.  However, sound 
information on costs is not always available and estimates may not be sufficiently 
reliable, so it is not always easy to calculate the costs of various options. 
 
The assessment of benefits is infinitely more difficult because of the lack of 
information on matters such as precisely who benefits, how they benefit and to 
what extent.  Although research was instigated into the provision of such 
measures, at the time there was nothing reliable on which to base decisions about 
priorities.  Because of this difficulty in assessing options according to any scientific 
decision making process, it appears that choices at national level were not always 
made objectively, but were arrived at by the subjective views, feelings, prejudices 
and preferences of the relevant Secretary of State as advised by the Department 
of Health and Social Security. 
 
This subjectivity is highlighted by illustrations of unpredictable and unstable 
priorities that can be attributed to political factors such as change in Government.  
One main cause is that the politicians responsible for the service are seldom in 
office for a sufficiently long period to fully implement their priorities.  Hence a 
serious problem may arise when a change of policy or priority is immediately 
followed by a change in policy maker. 
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In an organisational setting, the ideas of planning and control are often seen as 
part of a continuous cycle.  It is sometimes theoretically described as a series of 
events in which the planning system begins with setting priorities and results in 
feedback that can modify the original priorities.  The merit of such an approach is 
regarded as rational and results in a well-structured approach to the management 
task of choosing between priorities.  It also recognises that planning is a series of 
discrete but related events, and that appropriate techniques and expertise can be 
enlisted at various stages. 
 
Finding such a process actually in operation may be an impossible quest.  In 
practice, the distinction between the events may become blurred.  Selected 
priorities may often be reactionary expedients, and more radical, and perhaps 
appropriate, options may never be devised. 
 
The following summary of the events in the 1970s and 1980s will help make it 
clear why the model outlined above does not occur in reality. 
 
Turning priorities into action can be dependent on many variables, the two most 
significant being linked: the first is the commitment to the priorities and the second 
is related to the resources available at the time of implementation.  Commitment to 
priorities may be related to the degree of participation in their formulation and, as 
stated above, authorities tend not to participate effectively in the formation of 
National Health Service priorities in a way that allows them to put forward a view of 
their specific, directly assessed requirements. 
 
If local priorities have eventually to be subordinated to national priorities over the 
long term, the local priorities are likely to assume a much greater significance to 
authorities in the short term.  When demands on limited current resources were 
being considered by regional and district health authorities, they may have tended 
to favour their own local priorities where these differed from those of the 
Department of Health and Social Security. 
 
The National Health Service Planning System could only be considered, therefore, 
as an instrument of control for the preparation of health authorities' strategic and 
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operational plans, and it did not function at the point where priorities were turned 
into the delivery of service.  This role fell to the regional health authority in its 
monitoring capacity as an agent of the Department of Health and Social Security. 
 
The former area health authorities were asked to take account of such national 
priorities as the shift of resources from the more glamorous work, such as surgery, 
to services like the elderly and mentally handicapped.  The shift was not 
implemented owing to the power of the medical staff to determine the distribution 
of resources between patient groups.  It appears that senior medical staff who 
provided acute services had more influence over the distribution of resources than 
those doctors who provided caring services for long-stay patients.  This outcome 
arose even when priorities were fairly precisely defined in a document that 
specified the desired distribution of resources between the patient groups.  The 
broader priorities elicited even less conviction where district authorities chose to 
interpret the required redistribution of resources to its favour. 
 
The concept of rational decision making embraces that of zero-based budgeting 
whereby no part of a budget is automatically carried forward to a future year 
without justification.  In its pure form it requires managers to attach not only a cost 
to each of the departments’ activities or planned activities, but also a valuation of 
the benefits accruing from that activity.  All the activities of the organisation are 
then ranked in order of desirability as measured by their net benefits.  Given that 
the organisation has limited resources, not all the activities will be capable of 
implementation and so a cut-off point must be drawn.  In this way, top 
management ensures that every year full consideration is given to the way in 
which the organisation uses resources, and ensures that only priorities are 
implemented. 
 
The next chapter draws together the previous chapters in this dissertation with the 
object of concluding whether there may be a better way of approaching decision 
making, resource allocation and financial management in higher education 
institutions. 
  
92 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Analysis and conclusions 
 
The National Health Service spent about £63 billion in 2003-04 (NAO, 2005a), a 
significant proportion of which was consumed by pay.  It can clearly be seen, 
therefore, to be a labour intensive service, the largest sector being the nursing 
staff.  Although this sum appears very large, it must be remembered that it 
represents only about 5½% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (ONS, 2006). 
 
Because the National Health Service is a 'demand' service where the volume of 
treatment is controlled by the numbers of patients, the problems of achieving the 
optimal provision of services are magnified.  All staff in the National Health 
Service, especially the clinician who is normally the first point of contact and, 
therefore, the generator of treatment and, by inference, of resources also, are 
confronted by the problems of having to manage set resources being consumed 
by a virtually uncontrollable demand. 
 
At the present time, growth in funding in real terms lags behind the growth in 
demand, and the need for cost effectiveness becomes of critical importance.  The 
focus then tends to fall on performance, especially in view of the fact that the 
National Health Service is a labour intensive service, and the question must be 
asked, "Is there sufficient data available to be able to carry out cost effectiveness 
studies?" 
 
If we remind ourselves of the chapter on rationalism, the introduction of cost 
effectiveness studies involves the concept of 'rational management', including 
such techniques as Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems (PPBS), 
Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) and Management by Objectives (MBO).  
All of these techniques involve an exhaustive system of evaluation, requiring a 
great deal of data. 
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If one looks at the experience of local government from the late sixties, corporate 
planning was seen as a means of unifying the activities of a local authority so 
enabling a shifting of resources in response to needs.  It was an attempt to move 
away from traditional incremental planning and budgeting.  It was not very 
successful as the main requirements of the rational model of decision making 
could not be properly met.  These stages are that there needs to be an analysis of 
needs, issues and problems in the community, there needs to be a definition of 
objectives, a setting of priorities, a consideration of options, an implementation of 
chosen options, and the monitoring of activities to measure achievement and 
continuing review of the environment to assess appropriateness of policies. 
 
This type of exercise can be linked with that outlined in the National Health Service 
Planning System, whereby the government, as provider of approximately 90% of 
National Health Service expenditure, sought to introduce a rational method of 
decision making into National Health Service planning and budgeting.  It was 
inevitable that such a system would fail because, at that time, those necessary 
preconditions of such a system, for example, adequate management information, 
performance and workload data/statistics, were not available.  Indeed, there was a 
great deal of work undertaken in some health authorities, for example Wessex 
Region, and a joint exercise between the Department of Health and Social 
Security and the Northern Region, into the provision of performance data, etc. to 
enable the successful implementation of rational methods of decision making. 
 
However, until such exercises produce the desired, and necessary results, rational 
decision making in the National Health Service will probably fail and financial 
management processes will continue to be incremental.   
 
It is also worth noting that Carter and Perrin (1983) found, when examining 
budgeting and management accounting in the National Health Service, that the 
incremental system does work 'at least to the extent that almost always district 
health authorities do manage to contain expenditure within their allocations, or at 
least to overspend by only some small amount which may be balanced out with 
underspends elsewhere in the region'. 
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The situation faced by higher education institutions is almost analogous to that 
faced by the National Health Service.  Higher education institutions have to 
respond to demand, albeit a more controlled demand than that faced by the 
National Health Service, but against a background of real-terms reduced levels of 
funding.  Higher education institutions comprise a collection of academics who, in 
the main, are following a social career path, and who are very personally focussed 
in terms of their aspirations and needs.  The financial management of the 
resources of higher education institutions would appear, therefore, to have a need 
to take account of this fact, and any system should be very sensitive to human 
behaviour if it is to succeed. 
 
A successful financial management system seems to need to embrace, therefore, 
the requirement that it be participatory, not confrontational, since academics are 
the prime consumers of resource, are not generally motivated by financial 
considerations, and do not operate in an environment that is geared towards the 
financial needs of the business.  Unlike in the business environment, good 
academics are highly sought after, and the majority of them will be looking to work 
for an organisation that can deliver the resources they feel they require to 
undertake their research and teaching activities.  If they perceive that the 
organisation cannot satisfy that need, they are likely to look to a higher education 
institution that can. 
 
A higher education institution will find it very difficult to function effectively, in terms 
of academic success, without good academics, and it is inevitable that any 
financial management system should take account of this fact if it is to be effective.  
For this reason, a participatory approach is likely to be the most effective, and that 
approach is offered by the incrementalism approach.  It should also probably be 
linked to a resource allocation model that is pro-active, and one that can translate 
a higher education institution’s objectives into the proper and directed allocation of 
resources, rather than be linked to a set of pre-determined factors that might 
produce an effect that is in direct conflict with the higher education institution’s 
objectives. 
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It is also extremely important for a resource allocation model to be capable of 
dealing with pro-active decisions, and one that can also reflect responsiveness.  A 
resource allocation model such as that used by HEFCE and, by inference, most 
higher education institutions, is unlikely to be capable of delivering these two 
things, since it is based on a production line mentality whereby there is an 
assumption that there is a linear relationship between cost and level of activity.  
That is simply not the case in higher education, and the use of such a mechanistic 
model is likely to be doomed to failure or, at the very least, to introduce unintended 
adverse consequences as a result of applying national principles at an institutional 
level. 
 
There is a significant challenge in the adoption of the type of approach suggested, 
but one that, I am pleased to say, has recently been adopted by Brunel University.  
Time will tell as to whether it is successful, but it is highly likely that management 
will no longer be able to hide behind a mechanistic model to defend the way in 
which resources are allocated across a higher education institution. 
 
I would suggest that the current state of the finances of the National Health 
Service offers a stark reminder of the problems that can arise as a result of a 
failure to adopt a financial management system that takes proper and full account 
of the principles set out in this dissertation. 
 
The reliance on the use of rationalism principles continues to produce adverse 
consequences for the National Health Service.  One of the most recent 
developments introduced as a result of the adoption of the strategy set out in 
Delivering the NHS Plan was Payment by Results.  This was intended to provide a 
transparent, rules-based system for paying trusts under which, instead of block 
contracts for hospitals, payment would be based on the elective activity that they 
undertook.  This implied significant reliance, yet again, on the availability of robust 
data; indeed, Delivering the NHS Plan (NHS, 2002b) promised that ‘significant 
new investment in IT systems will drive change’. 
 
The Audit Commission published a report in 2004 (Audit Commission, 2004b) 
following its review of the new Payment by Results system.  Whilst acknowledging 
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that the new system offered major opportunities and incentives, the Audit 
Commission also warned of the major risks which, if not well managed, would lead 
to financial instability and service difficulties (Audit Commission, 2004c).  One of 
the key risks identified related to the quality of the data on which the new system 
relied.  Not only would it be necessary for the Department of Health to have 
reliable cost and activity data on which to base the national tariff, but trusts would 
need good quality activity data for billing purposes and accurate knowledge of their 
costs. 
 
The Audit Commission pointed out that, in a review at the end of 2003-04, auditors 
found inaccuracies of 5% or more in most trusts’ reference cost submissions, 
some inaccuracies in costing information, and a significant weakness in activity 
data.  Many of the problems arose from outdated Patient Administration Systems, 
lack of clinical involvement and weakness in the recruitment, training and 
leadership of clinical coding staff.  The Audit Commission also concluded that ‘the 
recording and coding of activity is less reliable than would be expected for 
payment purposes – both for provider and commissioner.  What is more, there are 
currently no obvious safeguards to prevent adjustments in recording activity that 
are not the result of genuine clinical changes’ (Audit Commission, 2004d). 
 
The Audit Commission’s review highlighted two of the same issues that were also 
identified in the review of the NHS Planning System that was undertaken in the 
1980s as needing to be addressed, these being the availability of robust data and 
the need to involve clinicians in the decision making process.  Is it any wonder, I 
would venture to suggest, that the continued reliance on a rationalism approach to 
reviews of the National Health Service, predicated on the basis of the availability of 
robust data that is clearly not available, has resulted in the current financial crisis 
in the National Health Service. 
 
In a Press Release issued by the National Audit Office (NAO, 2005b), James 
Strachan, Chairman of the Audit Commission, said “Financial management is now 
a matter of major concern for the NHS………Important reforms like Payment by 
Results and the new financial regime for NHS Foundation Trusts are also 
increasing the risks and demand first class financial management…..”. 
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In a recent Press Release issued by the Department of Health (DoH, 2006), the 
Health Secretary acknowledged that, in 2004/05, the National Health Service 
overspent for the first time since 1999/2000 to the tune of £250 million, and recent 
mid-year financial forecasts projected a net overspend for 2005/06 of £623 million.  
The solution to the problem, as seen by the Health Secretary and the then NHS 
Chief Executive, was to appoint ‘turnaround teams’ to help those forecasting 
financial challenges provide more cost-effective services for patients! 
 
Management take note and beware! 
 
7.2 Critical review of the thesis 
 
The strengths are apparent when one considers the objectives of higher education 
institutions.  Every higher education institution that wishes to be, and remain, 
attractive to students, whilst delivering high quality teaching and research by a 
cadre of skilled and motivated academics, will need to ensure that it uses its 
resources to maximum benefit and effect.  A financial management system that is 
capable of delivering these objectives through the effective allocation of resources 
is highly sought after, and those higher education institutions that can introduce, 
and operate, such a system will probably gain a competitive advantage.  This is 
becoming increasingly important, and is likely to become even more so following 
the introduction in September 2006 of top-up fees.  The proposed approach is one 
that is founded on the historical position, and is less likely, therefore, to prove an 
obstacle to those who are wedded to a system that is unlikely to produce 
significant changes in year on year financial positions. 
 
The weaknesses are also apparent.  The proposed approach is one that remains 
largely untested in the higher education world.  It is also one that requires the 
commitment to embrace a system that does not necessarily reward those 
individual areas that generate additional resources, although that would be a likely 
outcome, but is geared towards the greater good of the higher education 
institution.  Whilst the proposed approach is one that is based on the premise that 
such an approach is likely to be to the benefit of all in the medium to long term, 
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such a premise is likely to require great skill in its effective dissemination, 
especially amongst the academic community. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
BRUNEL UNIVERSITY’S RESOURCE ALLOCATION METHOD FROM 2005/06 
 
8.1 Overview 
 
This chapter sets out the principles on which I based my case for moving away from the 
mechanistic model used by Brunel University to one based on the principles of 
incrementalism.  It also sets out the method by which Brunel University’s resources 
were distributed for the allocation round 2005/06. 
 
8.2 Principles driving change 
 
In summary these were: 
 
i the Resource Allocation Model (RAM) was too mechanistic and did not help in 
the delivery of strategic objectives; 
 
ii the use of the Higher Education Funding Council for England’s (HEFCE’s) 
national model for allocating the grant to higher education institutions cannot (of itself) 
assist in the delivery of the University’s objectives.  It is formula rather than target 
driven; 
 
iii changes in HEFCE’s funding method could cause instability if slavishly followed; 
 
iv there should be stability in base funding levels from year to year, subject to the 
need to respond to unforeseen adverse circumstances; 
 
v the allocation of central costs, especially where these are informed by usage 
counts, can discourage the use of key services, for example, the Library; 
 
vi the University must provide for a stable academic environment to the next 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE); 
 
vii the University should allow for, and reward, planned growth; and, 
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viii the University should reward achievement against institutional objectives. 
 
8.3 Features of the new method 
 
These are: 
 
i the establishment of a base position with regard to pay and non-pay.  For 
schools, this is based on an adjusted version of the 2004-05 departmental budgets; 
 
ii the pooling of all income above the agreed base costs for academic and non-
academic areas; 
 
iii 3-year (macro-level) plans for academic and non-academic cost centres that 
allow for the award of additional income above base funding, subject to performance 
and prioritisation of plans in support of strategic objectives.  Plans must be provided for 
each school, non-academic department, trading area and self-financing institute; 
 
iv the establishment of panels for the academic and non-academic areas to 
consider the prioritisation of plans in relation to the extent to which they maximise the 
achievement of the University’s strategic objectives.  The outcome of these panels will 
be used as the basis for making recommendations to the Vice Chancellor regarding the 
distribution of additional income above the agreed base level; 
 
v continuation of the current system of rewarding, in-year, schools that generate 
tuition fee income above that assumed in the allocation model.  For academic areas, 
this is likely to be increased to X% of the net additional tuition fee income generated.  
This additional income will be made available subject to the approval of a plan for its 
use; 
 
vi move from the module activity counts of the RAM to a more simplified student 
population count; and, 
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vii in considering levels of funding, due regard will be paid to the need to comply 
with any contract conditions which define levels of provision, for example, Staff/Student 
Ratios. 
 
8.4 Process for implementing the new method 
 
i All academic, non-academic, trading and self-financing areas will be expected to 
complete, by the end of February 2005, plans detailing non-grant income, pay and non-
pay expenditure for the period 2005-06 to 2007-08; 
 
ii there is no intention to micro-manage, but plans will need to contain the following 
as a minimum: 
 
• all pay for 2005-06 will be assumed as base (adjusted 2004-05) plus an 
agreed uplift for assumed pay awards; 
 
• all non-pay for 2005-06 will be assumed as base; 
 
• space allocations for 2005-06 will be assumed to be as they were in 2004-05.  
This is naturally subject to change because of, for example, planned moves of 
some Schools as a consequence of the consolidation onto the Uxbridge 
campus.  It is also anticipated that a mechanism for reviewing space 
requirements will be developed; and, 
 
• developments identified above the base level will be considered and prioritised 
by the panels.  It is expected that macro-level plans will demonstrate how 
developments contribute to the delivery of the University’s strategic objectives. 
  
iii Schools, Non-academic, Trading and Self-financing Institutes Plans.  A pro 
forma will be developed with the following sections: 
 
• a staffing plan 2005-06 to 2007-08 (academic, non-academic, trading and self-
financing institutes); 
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• each Head of School and Senior Manager for the other areas will receive a 
baseline pay budget for 2005-06 to 2007-08, incorporating the pay inflation 
assumptions.  These will be used ONLY for the formal validation of the data.  
Any increase in staffing numbers or costs must be made as a completely 
separate development bid, and justification will need to be provided as to how, 
and to what extent, the changes proposed will contribute to the achievement of 
the University’s strategic objectives.   Development bids will be considered by 
the appropriate panel and, where approved, additional funding will be made 
available; 
 
• Staff/Student Ratio comparisons with peer institutions (Schools only); 
 
• student population plan 2005-06 to 2007-08 (academic only).  Each Head of 
School will be asked to identify areas of growth (if any) in the School’s 
numbers of Undergraduate, Post Graduate Taught and Post Graduate 
Research in terms of Home/European Union and International.  This should be 
cross-referenced to Section 1 if there are any implications for staffing or costs; 
 
• target populations for HEFCE contract and other populations - division of 
HEFCE population will be negotiated with each Head of School by the Vice 
Principal.  Tuition fee assumptions will also be incorporated; 
 
• an outline of the management and administrative structure of the School 
(academic only); 
 
• space needs (academic, non-academic, trading and self-financing institutes).  
An opportunity for each Head of School/Senior Manager to identify 
amendments to space requirements due to anticipated changes in the period.  
Extracts will be provided to the Managing Director (Resources and Operations) 
for consideration; 
 
• course portfolio and modes of delivery (academic only).  It is assumed that all 
Heads of Schools will be actively reviewing their portfolios.  Each Head of 
School will be asked to identify likely changes to future provision that might 
  
103 
 
impact on required resources beyond the period of the plan.  Registry will 
provide a list of the University’s approved courses; 
 
• non-Pay 2005-06 to 2007-08 (academic, non-academic, trading and self-
financing institutes).  Each Head of School/Senior Manager will be asked to 
outline anticipated changes to the non-pay requirements of their School/area 
on a year to year basis.  Non-pay base budgets will be issued at 2004-05 
levels.  Any increases sought must be made as a separate development bid, 
and justification will need to be provided as to how, and to what extent, the 
changes proposed will contribute to the achievement of the University’s 
strategic objectives.  Development bids will be considered by the appropriate 
panel and, where approved, additional funding will be made available; and, 
 
• RAE 2008 (academic only).  Each Head of School will be asked to summarise 
their plans for RAE 2008 in the context of the percentage of research-active 
staff in the subject groups. 
 
iv 3 year Plan Review Process - each January within the period of the Plan, Heads 
of Schools/Senior Managers will be given the opportunity to revise the  
statement of needs agreed in the current plan in light of performance against the 
objectives underpinning the plan, and also against the University’s strategic objectives.  
The pro forma will be re-issued with updated attachments.  Panels will consider bids for 
additional funds for years 2 and 3 of the plan, and make recommendations to the Vice 
Chancellor; 
 
v University income projections will be produced in March of each year; and, 
 
vi base budgets cannot be guaranteed in circumstances where Schools have fallen 
below target student populations, or where non-academic, trading or self-financing 
institutes have failed to meet agreed objectives.  Should a Head of School/Senior 
Manager believe the circumstance to be temporary, they will be given an opportunity, 
through the planning revision process, to make a case for a continuation of the current 
budget level. 
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8.5 Operational timetable for implementation 
 
i December 2004 - HESES student snapshot used to inform University income; 
 
ii January 2005 - Planning Office issues 3 year plan pro forma and attachments; 
 
iii End of February 2005 - Heads of Schools/Senior Managers to submit draft plans 
to Planning team; 
  
iv March/April 2005 – Vice Principal, Managing Director and Secretary & Registrar 
receive 3-year plans; 
 
v March 2005 - University receives Grant Letter - Finance to complete income 
analysis by subject (gross) for Senior Management Group (March); 
 
vi March 2005 - Progress report to Senior Management Group and Finance 
Committee.  The progress report will contain the 2005/06 income analysis and the 
totals of the pay and non-pay base cost by School and administrative area and detail 
possible approaches to other payments such as Union subvention and Library.  It will 
clearly state the unadjusted additional income that remains to be allocated; 
 
vii top-slicing - whilst the need for top-slicing should be reduced in the new scheme, 
there will be a requirement to top-slice for such items as contributions to capital 
expenditure.  The Director of Finance will advise the panel on other provisions that 
must be a first call on the funds available for distribution; 
 
viii the Management Accounting team will produce an analysis of each School’s 
contribution to income generation at the gross level for monitoring purposes.  Similar 
analysis will be provided for other self-financing parts of the University to ensure Senior 
Management is aware of any activity that is not generating sufficient income to meet 
costs; 
 
ix April 2005 - Panels meet to discuss priorities; 
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x May 2005 - Final Allocations.  The Vice-Chancellor, Vice-Principal and Managing 
Director (R&O) with support from the Director of Finance meet to receive 
recommendations from both panels; 
 
xi Senior Management Group receives proposed budget totals; 
 
xii finance prepares final budgets for 2005-06; and, 
 
xiii June 2005 - School Plans to Strategic Planning and Review Committee, and 
recommended budgets to Finance Committee. 
 
8.6 Academic and Non-Academic Panels 
 
i the academic panel (which will consist of the Vice-Principal, PVC (Research) 
and the Heads of Schools, with support from the Director of Finance) will agree the 
priorities for distributing any additional income above base in the context of School 
Plans, targets and performance to date and within the context of the Strategic Plan and 
the University’s strategic objectives.  The panel will also consider bids for top-slicing for 
any cross-school initiatives such as BRIEF or Research Leave; and, 
 
ii the non-academic panel (which will consist of the Managing Director and the 
Secretary and Registrar, with support from the Director of Finance) will consider and 
prioritise bids for additional expenditure in relation to the extent to which these bids 
support the achievement of the University’s strategic objectives. 
 
8.7 Further research 
 
Whilst I am pleased, and proud, that my own institution has adopted the approach 
proposed in this dissertation, I am not naive enough to believe that this justifies the 
approach as one that, without further evidence of its impact and effect, should be 
embraced by all higher education institutions.  The outcome of this piece of research 
may be regarded as the first stage in a piece of action research, since to establish the 
validity of the proposed approach, more research will need to be undertaken in terms of 
evaluating the success of the approach within my own University, identifying other 
  
106 
 
higher education institutions that may operate a similar system, and seeking to define 
ways in which the impact and effect of the proposed approach can be compared with 
those of the traditional HEFCE based approach.  This would be a major piece of 
research, but one that, in my view, could deliver significant benefits to both individual 
higher education institutions and the wider higher education fraternity, not to mention a 
more effective use of the public and private resources consumed by higher education 
institutions. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
PERSONAL REFLECTIONS 
 
9.1 Overview 
 
When I embarked on my thesis, I very soon found that I began asking myself a 
number of questions: 
 
“What will this contribute to the furtherance of knowledge?” 
 
“Who am I to seek to change, through the encouragement of reflection, the habits 
and practices of higher education institutions that have existed for many years, 
and which are managed by people with, probably, a far greater intellect than 
mine?” 
 
“Is this a crusade that is founded on personal beliefs rather than substance?” 
 
I must confess that I did think very hard about whether, in light of these questions, 
I should continue with my studies, particularly as the demands on me from my 
working life were significant.  As I continued with my research I soon found that my 
doubts were actually becoming challenges.  In some small way, I may actually be 
able to influence the way in which the higher education sector develops in terms of 
ensuring that, arguably, the single most important element in any organisation’s 
armoury, that is, the resources available to it, are employed to maximum benefit 
and effect.  The sums involved are enormous, and the benefits to be achieved 
could be very significant in terms of higher education institutions using those 
resources to develop at a faster and more productive rate than might be the case 
by following the perceived ‘tried, trusted and safe’ HEFCE based system. 
 
This perception and belief drove me on, and I am very glad that I did not allow my 
initial doubts and scepticism to divert me from my goal. 
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9.2 Securing change at Brunel University 
 
I suspect it is uncommon for a PhD student to be in a position that enables them to 
have an influence over the subsequent application of their research.  I am pleased 
to be in such a privileged position in that, as the finance director of Brunel 
University, a member of its senior management team, and the co-ordinator of the 
resource allocation process, I was able to use my research as the basis for 
proposing that my own University should change its resource allocation process to 
one that, in my view, is ‘fit for purpose’, and able to respond pro-actively to the 
achievement of the University’s strategic objectives. 
 
I have set out, in chapter 8, details of Brunel University’s revised approach to 
resource allocation, an approach that is based on the principles of incrementalism, 
together with the pro-active strategic assessment of the distribution of resources 
above the base level.  I term the model an ‘expenditure-based’ resource allocation 
model. 
 
The process for securing a change of approach was not without pain and 
considerable effort.  I spent many months explaining the approach to colleagues 
within the University, and to lay members of the University’s Council, through 
many meetings of the senior management team, Strategic Planning and Review 
Committee and Finance Committee.  In my opinion, my colleagues have 
demonstrated considerable foresight in adopting my proposed approach, and I feel 
certain that their confidence in the ability of the new approach to facilitate better 
the delivery of the University’s strategic objectives will not be misplaced.  I believe 
the adoption of the expenditure-based model puts Brunel University at the 
forefront of financial management, in its widest sense, in the higher education 
sector, and that this model will prove to be used more widely over the coming 
years. 
 
Perhaps this is the biggest reward for which I could have hoped, and the result has 
convinced me that, if you believe strongly in a concept, and are able to convince 
others of its worth, the rewards are well worth the effort and pain of the journey. 
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9.3 Outcomes achieved 
 
The use of an expenditure-based model has enabled the University to use its 
resource allocation method to facilitate the achievement of its strategic objectives, 
whilst at the same time preserving, through the use of base budget levels, the 
financial position of academic schools, institutes and non-academic departments. 
In particular, the following outcomes would not have been possible under the 
former allocation model: 
 
• the preservation of current year funding levels as a minimum allocation for 
the following year; 
 
• the pro-active allocation of funds additional to the agreed base level to meet 
strategic objectives; 
 
• the use of panels to determine and agree priorities for the additional funds; 
 
• the agreement of the panels to allocate the bulk of the additional funds 
available for 2005/06 to two areas considered to be key to the strategy to 
become a research-led university.  The two key areas were not growth 
areas, in terms of their ability to raise their profile and hence recruit more 
students, and would not have received any additional funds under the 
former model; and, 
 
• the removal of levies to fund key services, for example, library services. 
 
9.4 Criticism of the Incrementalism approach 
 
The major criticism levelled at the incrementalism approach is that it perpetuates 
past inefficiencies or mis-use of resources.  Whilst there may be an element of 
truth in this, the study of the National Health Service serves as a stark reminder 
that, unless one has systems that will provide accurate and comprehensive data to 
inform the decision making process, and the organisation is capable of both 
  
110 
 
identifying, providing and evaluating that data, the rationalism approach is doomed 
to failure. 
 
I would also add that, in my experience, rationalism works only where there are 
limited choices to be made, and where those choices can be expressed in 
financial terms.  I believe that in organisations that have multiple aims, and 
particularly in those that are concerned with the provision of services that can be 
regarded as having a social implication, the use of the incrementalism approach, 
coupled with the use of an expenditure-based allocation system, enables those 
organisations to address any such inefficiencies in a controlled and strategically 
planned manner.  Such an approach is, in my view, more likely to be successful in 
avoiding the human behavioural problems created by the rationalism approach.  
The environment that exists in higher education institutions is one in which the 
built-in process of negotiation, bargaining and compromise among many legitimate 
participants in the policy arena is virtually the only way to get things done. 
 
Having said this, I do accept that adverse circumstances may arise that some 
might argue would render the incrementalism approach untenable, for example, a 
significant reduction in resources.  I would respond to this by suggesting that, even 
under these circumstances, an incrementalism approach to the identification of 
reductions in allocations is more likely to produce, in the case of organisations that 
operate in a social context, more acceptable outcomes than a rationalism 
approach that seeks to review the whole spectrum of activities on the basis of an 
evaluation that is likely to be incomplete at best. 
 
9.5 Action research 
 
Whilst this dissertation did not start life as a piece of action research, it developed into 
just such a piece of research.  Action research is both a qualitative and quantitative 
research method, and one of the most widely cited definitions of action research is that 
of Rapoport (1970) who defined action research in the following way: “Action research 
aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an immediate problematic 
situation and to the goals of social science by joint collaboration within a mutually 
acceptable ethical framework”. 
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The essence of action research is a simple two stage process: 
 
• firstly, a diagnostic stage involving a collaborative analysis of the social situation 
by the researcher and the subjects of the research.  Theories are formulated 
concerning the nature of the research domain; and, 
 
• secondly, a therapeutic stage involving collaborative change.  Changes are 
introduced and the effects are studied. 
 
While this is a fairly conservative view of action research, it is useful because it 
stresses three things: 
 
• that action research should always be grounded in the concerns of 
stakeholders and should be collaborative in nature; 
 
• that it involves research as well as action; and, 
 
• that it should contribute to our knowledge as well as work on particular issues. 
 
The definition draws attention to the collaborative aspect of action research and to 
possible ethical dilemmas which might arise from its use.  It also makes clear that 
action research is concerned not only with the application of social scientific 
knowledge, but also with adding to the body of knowledge.  While action research 
has been accepted as a valid research method in applied fields, in information 
systems it has been mostly ignored.  In an article published in 2004, Baskerville 
and Myers (Baskerville and Myers, 2004) suggested that action research aims to 
solve current practical problems while expanding scientific knowledge.  Unlike 
other research methods, where the researcher seeks to study organisational 
phenomena but not to change them, the action researcher is concerned to create 
organisational change and simultaneously to study the process (Baburoglu and 
Ravn, 1992).  It is strongly oriented towards collaboration and change involving 
both researcher and subject.  It is an iterative process that capitalises on learning 
by both researchers and subjects within the context of the subjects’ social 
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systems.  It is a clinical method that puts Information Systems researchers in a 
helping role with practitioners. 
 
9.6 The future 
 
The implementation of the new model at my University has completed the first 
stage of the action research approach, but there now remains the need to 
undertake the second stage which involves a study of the effects of the new 
method.  This will necessitate a review of the financial and human behaviour 
aspects, since my approach is based not only on the perceived advantages of an 
incrementalism approach to resource allocation, but also on the need for close 
interaction and collaboration between all of the stakeholders within the University 
in respect of the decision-making process. 
 
In terms of the continued development of the expenditure-based resource 
allocation model within Brunel University, there remains a need to develop a 
process that will enable some of the activities that have been taken out of the 
former levy system to be assessed in terms of their effectiveness.  One example is 
estate costs.  These were levied according to the relative space being occupied, 
but this approach neither encouraged nor discouraged any area of activity from 
relinquishing space.  There is a view that some system of penalty should be 
applied to those areas that are regarded as having excess space.  This implies 
that it is possible to assess the amount of space that should actually be occupied 
by a particular area of activity; if this is the case, it should be possible to ensure 
that space is allocated to maximum effect without the need for the application of 
financial penalties through a levy system. 
 
As the expenditure-based resource allocation method was only implemented at 
Brunel University this year, it is too early to draw a conclusion as to its 
effectiveness.  I believe that such a model has to be adopted by higher education 
institutions and, I would suggest, establishments in other education sectors, if they 
are to stand any chance of being able to deliver their stated strategic objectives 
whilst maintaining financial stability and harmony amongst the academic and non-
academic fraternities.  In my opinion, the continued use of a mechanistic model, 
particularly one based on the use of national criteria, is an abrogation of 
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management responsibility for pro-active action in delivering strategic objectives.  
It will not facilitate the effective development of higher education, but will continue 
to produce potentially unwelcome and damaging outcomes. 
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Annex A 
Resource allocation questionnaire sent to higher education institutions 
 
1  Is your Resource Allocation Model a student number income-distribution model based 
primarily on HEFCE's funding allocation formula? 
        
 
        
2  If the answer to Question 1 is Yes, do you believe that such a model facilitates the delivery 
of the university's strategic objectives? 
        
         
University  Question 1  Question 2  
  
Y  N  Y N  
         
1  1     1  
2    1     
3  1       
4    1     
5  1    1   
6    1     
7  1    1   
8  1    1   
9  1    1   
10  1    1   
11  1    1   
12    1     
13  1    1   
14  1    1   
15  1     1  
16  1    1   
17    1     
18  1    1   
19  1    1   
20  1     1  
21  1    1   
22  1     1  
23  1    1   
24    1     
25    1     
26  1    1   
27  1    1   
28    1     
29    1     
30  1     1  
31  1    1   
32  1    1   
33  1    1   
34    1     
35  1    1   
36  1    1   
37  1    1   
38    1     
39    1     
40  1       
                                          A - 1         
1  Is your Resource Allocation Model a student number income-distribution model based 
primarily on HEFCE's funding allocation formula? 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  If the answer to Question 1 is Yes, do you believe that such a model 
delivery of the university's strategic objectives?      
 
 
 
 
 
 
University  Question 1  Question 2  
  
Y  N  Y N 
 
        1   
41    1   1  
42  1     1  
43  1    1   
44  1    1   
45  1    1   
46    1     
47  1    1   
48  1    1   
49  1    1   
50  1    1   
51  1    1   
52  1    1   
53    1     
54  1     1  
55  1     1  
56  1     1  
57  1    1   
58    1     
59    1     
60  1    1   
61    1     
62  1     1  
63  1     1  
64  1    1   
65  1     1  
66  1    1   
67  1    1   
68    1     
69  1    1   
70  1     1  
71  1     1  
72  1    1   
73    1     
74  1    1   
75  1     1  
76  1    1   
77    1     
78    1     
79  1    1   
80  1     1  
81  1    1   
         
TOTAL     59  22  42 17  
         
                                                                             A - 2 
 
BRUNEL UNIVERSITY
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 2004/2005
SUMMARY OF NET ALLOCATIONS - ACTUAL MODEL
Budget Centre Gross Academic Staff- Student- Stud.-rel. Space- Sub Research Transfers Net
allocations service related related levies related Total Levy added allocations
levies levies levies (excl. contracts) levies 1% back
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences
School of International Studies 1,237,908 240,330 16,941 157,218 31,052 99,634 692,733 6,927 685,805
School of Business & Management 3,724,227 573,742 47,630 425,505 84,042 265,234 2,328,075 23,281 2,304,794
Economics and Finance 1,927,313 263,698 29,017 208,772 41,235 207,971 1,176,620 11,766 1,164,854
English 1,014,123 200,358 12,100 138,189 27,294 61,475 574,706 5,747 568,959
Human Sciences 3,140,819 381,139 42,001 228,632 45,157 246,254 2,197,635 21,976 2,175,659
Law 1,620,266 259,173 15,786 165,748 32,737 99,822 1,047,000 10,470 1,036,530
Language Centre 169,726 17,732 4,386 14,084 2,782 46,873 83,868 839 110,000 193,029
Performing Arts 2,096,349 340,482 22,402 192,461 38,013 188,290 1,314,702 13,147 1,301,555
Faculty total 14,930,730 2,276,655 190,264 1,530,609 302,311 1,215,554 9,415,338 94,153 110,000 9,431,185
Faculty of Life Sciences
Biological Sciences 1,697,603 197,480 40,099 101,869 20,120 436,986 901,048 9,010 892,038
Education 3,102,971 414,883 33,412 302,703 59,787 295,800 1,996,386 19,964 230,000 2,206,422
Geography and Earth Sciences 679,829 97,397 13,255 53,594 10,585 118,939 386,059 3,861 382,198
Health and Social Care 6,527,418 590,247 77,785 450,649 45,209 389,090 4,974,437 49,744 218,000 5,142,692
Sport Sciences 2,154,384 231,751 22,322 186,050 36,747 175,886 1,501,628 15,016 1,486,612
Faculty total 14,162,205 1,531,758 186,873 1,094,866 172,448 1,416,701 9,759,558 97,596 448,000 10,109,962
Fac. of Tech & Info. Systems
Design and Systems Engineering 4,488,344 347,502 65,836 263,411 52,026 643,219 3,116,350 31,163 0 3,085,186
Electronic and Computer Engineering 5,332,933 407,096 63,504 315,464 62,307 556,763 3,927,799 39,278 3,888,521
Information Systems & Computing 6,245,554 439,039 67,834 363,423 71,780 382,818 4,920,659 49,207 4,871,452
Mathematical Sciences 2,044,871 194,554 25,618 124,424 24,575 172,723 1,502,977 15,030 1,487,947
Mechanical Engineering 3,328,147 268,885 37,074 190,107 37,548 512,518 2,282,015 22,820 2,259,195
Centre for Environmental Research 413,991 24,987 4,777 17,306 3,418 53,601 309,903 3,099 306,804
ETC -2,910 707 3,097 0 0 39,896 -46,609 -466 -46,143
Faculty total 21,850,931 1,682,770 267,739 1,274,134 251,654 2,361,538 16,013,095 160,131 0 15,852,964
The Henley Management College 31,338 12,627 15,625 3,086 0 0
Materials Teaching Unit 20,895 214 0 0 0 0 20,681 20,681
50,996,100 5,504,024 644,876 3,915,235 729,500 4,993,793 35,208,671 351,880 558,000 35,414,792
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BRUNEL UNIVERSITY
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 2004/2005
SUMMARY OF NET ALLOCATIONS - NO LIBRARY OR MEDIA SERVICES LEVIES
Budget Centre Gross Academic Staff- Student- Stud.-rel. Space- Sub Research Transfers Net
allocations service related related levies related Total Levy added allocations
levies levies levies (excl. contracts) levies 1% back
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences
School of International Studies 1,152,413 78,171 16,941 157,218 31,052 99,634 769,397 7,694 761,703
School of Business & Management 3,475,603 217,618 47,630 425,505 84,042 265,234 2,435,574 24,356 2,411,219
Economics and Finance 1,798,464 105,970 29,017 208,772 41,235 207,971 1,205,499 12,055 1,193,444
English 944,165 69,397 12,100 138,189 27,294 61,475 635,710 6,357 629,353
Human Sciences 2,923,803 114,549 42,001 228,632 45,157 246,254 2,247,210 22,472 2,224,738
Law 1,510,435 83,278 15,786 165,748 32,737 99,822 1,113,065 11,131 1,101,934
Language Centre 158,514 7,007 4,386 14,084 2,782 46,873 83,381 834 110,000 192,548
Performing Arts 1,951,962 96,753 22,402 192,461 38,013 188,290 1,414,043 14,140 1,399,903
Faculty total 13,915,360 772,743 190,264 1,530,609 302,311 1,215,554 9,903,879 99,039 110,000 9,914,840
Faculty of Life Sciences
Biological Sciences 1,579,050 50,885 40,099 101,869 20,120 436,986 929,090 9,291 919,799
Education 2,895,355 160,298 33,412 302,703 59,787 295,800 2,043,355 20,434 230,000 2,252,922
Geography and Earth Sciences 632,818 26,714 13,255 53,594 10,585 118,939 409,731 4,097 405,634
Health and Social Care 6,083,317 219,820 77,785 450,649 45,209 389,090 4,900,762 49,008 218,000 5,069,754
Sport Sciences 2,005,261 94,488 22,322 186,050 36,747 175,886 1,489,768 14,898 1,474,871
Faculty total 13,195,801 552,205 186,873 1,094,866 172,448 1,416,701 9,772,707 97,727 448,000 10,122,980
Fac. of Tech & Info. Systems
Design and Systems Engineering 4,187,581 144,588 65,836 263,411 52,026 643,219 3,018,501 30,185 0 2,988,316
Electronic and Computer Engineering 4,971,481 165,019 63,504 315,464 62,307 556,763 3,808,424 38,084 3,770,340
Information Systems & Computing 5,803,108 189,262 67,834 363,423 71,780 382,818 4,727,990 47,422 4,680,569
Mathematical Sciences 1,902,126 64,508 25,618 124,424 24,575 172,723 1,490,278 14,903 1,475,375
Mechanical Engineering 3,102,069 106,747 37,074 190,107 37,548 512,518 2,218,075 22,181 2,195,894
Centre for Environmental Research 385,520 10,827 4,777 17,306 3,418 53,601 295,592 2,956 292,636
ETC -2,910 0 3,097 0 0 39,896 -45,903 -459 -45,444
Faculty total 20,348,974 680,951 267,739 1,274,134 251,654 2,361,538 15,512,957 155,271 0 15,357,686
The Henley Management College 25,484 6,773 15,625 3,086 0 0
Materials Teaching Unit 19,285 0 0 0 0 0 19,285 19,285
47,504,905 2,012,672 644,876 3,915,235 729,500 4,993,793 35,208,829 352,037 558,000 35,414,792
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BRUNEL UNIVERSITY
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 2004/2005
SUMMARY OF NET ALLOCATIONS - NO LIBRARY, MEDIA SERVICES OR ACADEMIC SERVICE LEVIES
Budget Centre Gross Academic Staff- Student- Stud.-rel. Space- Sub Research Transfers Net
allocations service related related levies related Total Levy added allocations
levies levies levies (excl. contracts) levies 1% back
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences
School of International Studies 1,103,133 0 16,941 157,218 31,052 99,634 798,288 7,983 790,305
School of Business & Management 3,332,279 0 47,630 425,505 84,042 265,234 2,509,869 25,099 2,484,770
Economics and Finance 1,724,185 0 29,017 208,772 41,235 207,971 1,237,190 12,372 1,224,818
English 903,844 0 12,100 138,189 27,294 61,475 664,785 6,648 658,137
Human Sciences 2,798,703 0 42,001 228,632 45,157 246,254 2,236,659 22,367 2,214,292
Law 1,447,117 0 15,786 165,748 32,737 99,822 1,133,024 11,330 1,121,694
Language Centre 152,051 0 4,386 14,084 2,782 46,873 83,925 839 110,000 193,086
Performing Arts 1,868,741 0 22,402 192,461 38,013 188,290 1,427,575 14,276 1,413,300
Faculty total 13,330,053 0 190,264 1,530,609 302,311 1,215,554 10,091,315 100,913 110,000 10,100,402
Faculty of Life Sciences
Biological Sciences 1,510,714 0 40,099 101,869 20,120 436,986 911,640 9,116 902,524
Education 2,775,657 0 33,412 302,703 59,787 295,800 2,083,955 20,840 230,000 2,293,115
Geography and Earth Sciences 605,722 0 13,255 53,594 10,585 118,939 409,349 4,093 405,256
Health and Social Care 5,827,292 0 77,785 450,649 45,209 389,090 4,864,557 48,646 218,000 5,033,912
Sport Sciences 1,919,305 0 22,322 186,050 36,747 175,886 1,498,300 14,983 1,483,317
Faculty total 12,638,690 0 186,873 1,094,866 172,448 1,416,701 9,767,801 97,678 448,000 10,118,123
Fac. of Tech & Info. Systems
Design and Systems Engineering 4,014,176 0 65,836 263,411 52,026 643,219 2,989,684 29,897 0 2,959,787
Electronic and Computer Engineering 4,763,116 0 63,504 315,464 62,307 556,763 3,765,078 37,651 3,727,427
Information Systems & Computing 5,551,424 0 67,834 363,423 71,780 382,818 4,665,569 46,845 4,618,723
Mathematical Sciences 1,819,838 0 25,618 124,424 24,575 172,723 1,472,498 14,725 1,457,773
Mechanical Engineering 2,971,732 0 37,074 190,107 37,548 512,518 2,194,486 21,945 2,172,541
Centre for Environmental Research 369,106 0 4,777 17,306 3,418 53,601 290,005 2,900 287,104
ETC -2,910 0 3,097 0 0 39,896 -45,903 -459 -45,444
Faculty total 19,486,482 0 267,739 1,274,134 251,654 2,361,538 15,331,416 153,504 0 15,177,912
The Henley Management College 18,709 0 15,625 3,086 -3 -3
Materials Teaching Unit 18,357 0 0 0 0 0 18,357 18,357
45,492,291 0 644,876 3,915,235 729,500 4,993,793 35,208,886 352,095 558,000 35,414,791
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BRUNEL UNIVERSITY
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 2004/2005
SUMMARY OF NET ALLOCATIONS - COMPARISON OF OUTCOMES
RAM Actual
Budget Centre Net Net Difference Difference Net Difference Difference
allocations allocations allocations
£ £ £ % £ £ %
Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences
School of International Studies 685,805 761,703 75,897 11.1% 790,305 104,500 15.2%
School of Business & Management 2,304,794 2,411,219 106,425 4.6% 2,484,770 179,976 7.8%
Economics and Finance 1,164,854 1,193,444 28,590 2.5% 1,224,818 59,964 5.1%
English 568,959 629,353 60,393 10.6% 658,137 89,178 15.7%
Human Sciences 2,175,659 2,224,738 49,079 2.3% 2,214,292 38,633 1.8%
Law 1,036,530 1,101,934 65,404 6.3% 1,121,694 85,164 8.2%
Language Centre 193,029 192,548 -481 -0.2% 193,086 57 0.0%
Performing Arts 1,301,555 1,399,903 98,348 7.6% 1,413,300 111,745 8.6%
Faculty total 9,431,185 9,914,840 483,655 5.1% 10,100,402 669,217 7.1%
Faculty of Life Sciences
Biological Sciences 892,038 919,799 27,762 3.1% 902,524 10,486 1.2%
Education 2,206,422 2,252,922 46,499 2.1% 2,293,115 86,693 3.9%
Geography and Earth Sciences 382,198 405,634 23,435 6.1% 405,256 23,058 6.0%
Health and Social Care 5,142,692 5,069,754 -72,938 -1.4% 5,033,912 -108,781 -2.1%
Sport Sciences 1,486,612 1,474,871 -11,741 -0.8% 1,483,317 -3,295 -0.2%
Faculty total 10,109,962 10,122,980 13,018 0.1% 10,118,123 8,161 0.1%
Fac. of Tech & Info. Systems
Design and Systems Engineering 3,085,186 2,988,316 -96,870 -3.1% 2,959,787 -125,399 -4.1%
Electronic and Computer Engineering 3,888,521 3,770,340 -118,181 -3.0% 3,727,427 -161,094 -4.1%
Information Systems & Computing 4,871,452 4,680,569 -190,884 -3.9% 4,618,723 -252,729 -5.2%
Mathematical Sciences 1,487,947 1,475,375 -12,572 -0.8% 1,457,773 -30,175 -2.0%
Mechanical Engineering 2,259,195 2,195,894 -63,301 -2.8% 2,172,541 -86,655 -3.8%
Centre for Environmental Research 306,804 292,636 -14,169 -4.6% 287,104 -19,700 -6.4%
ETC -46,143 -45,444 699 -1.5% -45,444 699 -1.5%
Faculty total 15,852,964 15,357,686 -495,278 -3.1% 15,177,912 -675,052 -4.3%
The Henley Management College 0 0 0 346.4% -3 -3 -13659.0%
Materials Teaching Unit 20,681 19,285 -1,395 -6.7% 18,357 -2,324 -11.2%
35,414,792 35,414,792 0 0.0% 35,414,791 -0 0.0%
RAM no Library/Media RAM no Library, Media or Academic Services
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